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A LANDMARK IN PHILOSOPHY

BY C. E. M. JOAD

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S *History of Western Philosophy** is by any reckoning a great book. It performs for philosophy much the same office as Wells's *Outline of History* performed for history by providing the neral reader with a perspective within which he can plot the positions and termine the relations of what have hitherto been isolated little patches of ghtly lit thought and event separated by environing areas of darkness. He n now see the connections between the patches.

Writing of John Dewey, Russell says that he has never been what might be lled " a ' mere ' philosopher ", and he goes on to speak of Dewey's interest in ucation and his influence on American educational theory and practice. The mark might well be applied to Russell himself. He, too, has never been ntent to be a ' mere ' philosopher. Nor could his book have been written one so restricted.

Bertrand Russell has touched life at a number of points and left his mark on the age. One might surmise that to have specialized exclusively as a ilosopher would not in any age have contented him, though specialized ilosophy might well be deemed a sufficient occupation for most men in quiet nes. But in an age such as our own, an age without creed or code, an age, oreover, in which civilization manifestly hangs upon the edge of destruction, might plausibly be held that the philosopher should try to exert a practical fluence. Such, at least, was the philosopher's duty, as Socrates and Plato nceived it, in a not wholly dissimilar age. They brought philosophy down om the clouds into the market place, seeking to make plain for a distracted neration principles to live by and ends to live for.

Bertrand Russell, as I conceive, has been animated by not wholly dissimilar otives in the writing of this book. He has never been content to write oteric books addressed only to his own kind. Such a conception of the ilosopher's duty would seem to him in a time such as the present to be tantaount to the acceptance of too easy an option, as if one were to drive a car und and round a private track instead of outwards into the traffic.

In thus seeking to break away from the specialism and isolation—and the olation is the result of the specialism—of philosophy in our time, Russell is turning to an earlier tradition. For as recently as the nineteenth century

* Allen & Unwin. 21s.

philosophers were not content to be 'merely' philosophers. They were either amateurs, like Mill, or more often men of affairs, like Jowitt and Balfour. It was, no doubt, partly for this reason that in the nineteenth century philosophers exerted upon contemporary life an influence enormously greater than they wield to-day. Bentham and Mill and Spencer, Caird and T. H. Green and Jowitt—these were famous names and men knew them and were prepared to listen to what they had to say on subjects other than philosophy. With the possible exception of A. N. Whitehead, Russell is the only twentieth century English philosopher to wield a comparable influence and to carry on the tradition which confers it.

Speaking of the German Idealist movement, Russell says that "Kant, Fichte and Hegel were University professors, addressing learned audiences, not gentlemen of leisure addressing amateurs," as were for example, the "earlier French and English philosophers." I do not wish to suggest that Russell is "a gentleman of leisure"; but it is, I think, clear that in the writing of this book the audience which he has primarily had in mind is that of the "earlier French and English philosophers" and not that of the "University professors". For philosophy is here represented primarily as a criticism of life offered to those who are concerned to know what great men and women have thought and said memorably about life, rather than to those whose business it is to teach philosophy. For the former, it performs the useful office of enabling them to understand not only what the great philosophers talked about, but why they selected just those particular subjects for consideration at those particular times.

II

The distinctive purpose of the book is to present the thought of philosophers within the context of the setting of their times. This is because there is, in Bertrand Russell's view, a reciprocal connection between circumstances and philosophy: "the circumstance of men's lives do much to determine their philosophy, but, conversely their philosophy does much to determine their circumstances." Thus, it is suggested that it was *because* he was a Dominican monk whose purpose was "to declare the truth which the Catholic Faith professes" that most of St. Thomas's philosophy is a form of special pleading: "There is little of the true philosophical spirit in Aquinas . . . . The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy but special pleading . . . ." Examples of such special pleading are St. Thomas's solution of the question, what happens at the resurrection of the body to "a man who never, throughout his life, ate anything but human flesh, and whose parents did likewise" and his arguments for the indissolubility of marriage. Again, it is *because* Mohammed "had a strong class feeling that prophets ought not to come to a bad end" that he "adopted the view of the Docetics . . . . accord

g to which it was a mere phantom that hung upon the Cross." These are mparatively trivial examples; more far-reaching is Russell's division of socie- s into slave-gentlemen societies on the one hand and plutocrat-industrialist cieties on the other, each with its appropriate scale of values. In the former ntemplation is valued, in the latter, action. Thus, for Pythagoras, " passion- e sympathetic contemplation " which issued in mathematical knowledge was e chief end of man and views which accord contemplation a superiority over tion are found both in Plato and Aristotle. Though these are less strongly arked in Aristotle than in Plato, Professor Taylor can yet represent Aristotle's litical ideal as " that of a small but leisured and highly cultivated aristocracy . . free from the spirit of adventure and enterprise, pursuing the arts and ences quietly while its material needs are supplied by the labour of a class cluded from citizenship, kindly treated but without prospects." Such an eal, Russell suggests, is natural enough in a society where there are slaves to the work and produce the goods. Modern values are different: " In con- ction with a football match, modern-minded men think the players grander an the mere spectators. Similarly as regards the State: they admire more e politicians who are the contestants in the game than those who are only lookers."

The change in values reflects a change in the social system: " The gentleman s had a long innings in philosophical theory, because he is associated with e Greek genius, because the virtue of contemplation acquired theological dorsement, and because the ideal of disinterested truth dignified the academic e."

But a society of competitive " go-getters " engaged in manipulating machines s little use for contemplation; it feels that it must act, that is to say, it must er the position of pieces of matter in space, even if the chief effects of action e, as they are to-day, mainly harmful. Consequently we get modern power- ilosophies (of which more in a moment) and modern theories of truth such those offered by instrumentalism and pragmatism which deny the existence stubborn facts and think of the external world as something perpetually in e making (by us) rather than as something given to us.

The relation between thought and circumstance is further illustrated by the nnection traced throughout the book between the decline of authority and e growth of individualism and subjectivism. Both derive historically from e Rennaissance, the effect of which was to substitute for the authority of the urch as the vehicle of direct revelation the interpretation of the Bible accord- g to individual insight and the enthronement of the individual conscience the guide to right living. " The effects of this change," Russell says, " were omentous. Truth was no longer to be ascertained by consulting authority t by inward meditation." Among the consequences were, first, idealism in eory of knowledge, since by looking within it was discovered that one's own perience was the only reality of which one could be certain. Secondly, sub-

jectivism in morals and aesthetics—to say 'this is good or beautiful' means merely, that 'I, or most men at this time or in this country, or that most men at all times, or that the governing class of this society, happen to approve of it or derive feelings of satisfaction from it.' Thirdly, the cult of romantic ethics glorifying the emotions and lauding the hero, as it is expressed by "Carlyle and Nietzsche and the Byronic cult of violent passion of no matter what kind"—this, I should imagine, is the first history of philosophy to contain a chapter on Byron—and, fourthly, romanticism which, according to Russell, "is bound up with this subjective way of judging men, not as members of a community, but as aesthetically delightful objects of contemplation."

For my part, I find the most interesting of all the many connections which Bertrand Russell traces between thought and circumstance the correlation of optimistic philosophies with power and pessimistic philosophies with impotence, that is, with worldly impotence. Plato and Aristotle, he suggests, write about politics and tend to believe that men can be caused to behave better if reasoned with and exhorted, because they belong to governing classes who either enjoyed the actuality or retained the memory of power. When political power passed to Macedon, philosophers turned away from the State and devoted themselves to "the problem of individual virtue or salvation"; hence, the cynics, the sceptics and the stoics. "Aristotle is the last Greek philosopher who faces the world cheerfully; after him, all have, in one form or another, a philosophy of retreat. The world is bad; let us learn to be independent of it."

Early Christianity gave an immense fillip to these philosophies of withdrawal and escape, (i) by its conviction that this world would shortly come to an end and (ii) by its insistence that this world is in any event comparatively unimportant and is bound to be more or less unhappy in comparison with the infinitely more prolonged and happier life that awaits us hereafter. Such, at least, were the tenets of the early Christians and they accorded well with the worldly position and prospects of scattered groups of poor and impotent men. But from the fifth to the fifteenth century A.D. the Church was a great political power, at one time the greatest upon the earth. Clerics possessed, as a result, the mentality of a governing class and far from feeling themselves to be exiles in a hostile world had numerous opportunities for enjoying it themselves and improving it for others. Hence, the curious dualism that runs through the thought of the Middle Ages between the official acceptance of an other-worldly philosophy on the one hand and the actual enjoyment of this world's power on the other.

To-day the Church has lost power and the emphasis is once again on the inner life and upon movements of withdrawal designed to enable it to be lived more effectively. Hence, the modern cult of the Yogi which encourages us to seek for salvation within, except in Russia where men in governing positions feel themselves to be on the crest of a wave of social betterment and political expansion, with the result that nothing seems impossible and the Commissar

kes the place of the Yogi. The first attitude savours of sour grapes; the cond is liable to the danger of *hubris*.

The most interesting example of the effect of the circumstance of power-ossession upon a philosophy is afforded by the power-philosophies of the neteenth and early twentieth centuries of which Russell takes those of ergson, Dewey and William James as examples.

The nineteenth century witnessed a vast extension of man's power over ature, as the result of which the environment of man's life has during the st one hundred and fifty years been changed more radically and more rapidly nan during the whole of the preceding two thousand. These changes have ainly lain in the direction of increased control over matter.

During the same period there has grown up, largely under the influence of cience, an increasing disposition to think of the external universe as identical ith the natural order of events in Space-Time. It was, then, not surprising nat when the *natural* order was being rendered increasingly amenable o human control and its workings increasingly subservient to human ishes, the universe *as a whole* should come to be regarded as amenable nd subservient. Hence, the power-philosophies of the late nineteenth and arly twentieth centuries characterized, as Bertrand Russell points out, by a istinctive attitude to truth and a distinctive attitude to fact. Truth was no onger correspondence between ideas and external facts which were other than nd independent of the ideas; truth was what served human purposes and made nen happy. Truth was also something that men manufactured by the habit f intensely and persistently believing, acting in practice as if the beliefs were ue and finding the results of the actions beneficial. As with truth so with act. Facts in these philosophies are no longer "brute" and "stubborn"; ney are malleable, conformable to human wishes and almost, it would seem, esponsive to human desires. Russell quotes as a characteristic expression of oth attitudes, John Dewey's theory of "warranted assertability". Dewey olds that a belief has "'warranted assertability',—which he substitutes for truth'—if it has certain kinds of effects", if, that is to say, it serves the pur-ose which led to its being entertained. Russell comments: "If I find the elief that Caesar crossed the Rubicon very distasteful, I need not sit down in ull despair; I can, if I have enough skill and power, arrange a social environ-nent in which the statement that he did not cross the Rubicon will have warranted assertability." The connection between the doctrine of warranted ssertability and manufactured facts on the one hand and man's growing ower over nature on the other is manifest; for the doctrine is, in effect, only n extension to the external universe as a whole of that control which man has lready won over that section of the universe which is the natural order of patio-temporal events. What applied science had done for nature, meta-hysics was invoked to do for reality and theory of knowledge for history.

Bertrand Russell indicts this doctrine on the ground of "cosmic impiety".

The belief in an external universe of unamenable fact which the mind discovers but does not create, has, he points out, curbed man's pride and kept him humble. "The Greeks, with their dread of *hubris* and their belief in a Necessity or Fate superior even to Zeus, carefully avoided what would have seemed to them insolence towards the universe."

"Cosmic impiety" occurs when the human mind legislates instead of conforming to the universe, prescribing to it what it should be instead of adopting a modest attitude to what is. This is the source of intellectual *hubris,* the characteristic vice of our time. I quote Russell in full:

> In all this I feel a grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of "truth" as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness—the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.

This seems to me profoundly true. But the moral it embodies may, I suggest, be pushed further than Russell takes it and in two directions. First, the philosophies of Bergson and Alexander—Russell does not specifically deal with the latter—illustrate the same tendency by making reality wholly immanent in the evolutionary process which characterizes the natural order. For them, there nothing is exempt from the flux of change and the process of evolution.

Thus, for Alexander, the cosmic process which in the course of its development throws up consciousness as an emergent quality may proceed to a further stage and produce God or rather a succession of Gods. For in the universe, as these philosophies conceive it, nothing is stable and fixed; there are no absolutes; there is only the developing cosmic process. Therefore God, once achieved, can be overpassed and transcended by a super God. Deity, in fact, for Alexander is an unrealized ideal, representing the level of evolution yet to be reached and stimulating life at the level already reached to rise above itself by performing the office of goal or ideal to life at the already-realized level.

This way of thinking has two corollaries, the first intended, the second, I venture to suggest, unintended: (a) By representing the universe as being all of a piece (all of a piece with the natural order), it makes everything theoretically subservient to man; by including God in the natural process it brings God under human control. (b) By reducing whatever *is* to a single evolving order, the spatio-temporal order of the natural world to which our bodies belong, these philosophies inevitably have the effect of binding up the fate of the universe as a whole with the fate of that order.

For the time being, the time being, in fact, the first decade of the twentieth century, the order in question was, no doubt, doing well enough. It had pro-

uced the vertebrates from the mesozoic reptiles, man from the vertebrates and, o Nietzsche and Bernard Shaw were telling us, was about to produce the super an from man. To the men of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, xalted by the powers which man had won over nature, it seemed that there as no limit to what the *nisus* of an evolutionary universe striving ever upwards nd onwards might not achieve. But a nemesis lay in wait both for the evolu- onary process and for the philosophies which affirmed its identity with the niverse, a nemesis which affords a good illustration of the workings of the reek doctrine cited in the quotation from Bertrand Russell. According to ne second law of thermo-dynamics the spatio-temporal universe was to die, ie in the sense that its energy would run down and no further events of any ind would take place therein.

Now, a God who shares in the advance of, is, indeed, evolved by the natural rder of the universe, is involved also in its death. Therefore, the purely nmanent deities of the power-philosophies are like the universe, the single- evel universe, which they animate, under sentence of death. Such is the fate hich overtakes all universes whose deity is a mere *anima mundi,* is that is to ay, wholly immanent in themselves, just as it is the nemesis which lies in wait o visit its appropriate punishment upon what Russell calls the "cosmic npiety" of the power-philosophies.

It is no secret that the optimism of the early twentieth century as evaporated and has been succeeded by a mood which varies between mpotence and despair. It is, no doubt, true that we can control nature, con- ol it, indeed, with ever greater effectiveness. But to what end do we control ? Russell himself has pointed out in another connection that applied science ke the power which it bestows is ethically neutral. Its effect is to gratify ur desires and to further our purposes. If the desires and purposes are n the whole good and make for human welfare, then the power of gratifi- ation and furtherance is also good; if they are evil and make on the whole for uman misery, then the power, too, is evil.

Now the ends which power over nature has been chiefly used to subserve are ose of destruction in war and robotization in peace. Hence, it is no longer ossible for man to take a pride in his domination over nature and skill in evising machines without at the same time reflecting that the end to which ature when dominated is put is that of increasing efficiency in slaughter, while, s for the machines, these are now seen to dominate men to such effect that amuel Butler's half-serious suggestion that the machines represent the next evel of evolutionary development, destined to supersede man who evolved em, as surely as man superseded the animals who evolved him, begins to take n an alarming plausibility.

Thus, the stage of circumstance is set for another change of thought. Once gain the external world is seen as threatening, hostile and unamenable. Once gain the facts provide an incentive for philosophies of escape. It is not,

I suggest, wholly fanciful to see in the fashionable philosophy of logical analysis, to which Bertrand Russell devotes a final chapter, the distinctively modern version of metaphysical escapism. Mystics and Platonists came to terms with the external world of stubborn fact by declaring it to be semi-real; pragmatists and instrumentalists, by saying that the facts were not stubborn but amenable; logical analysts, by declaring that there are not and never were such things. Considered from the point of view of its excellence as a technique for dissolving the external world of given alien stuff utterly away, logical analysis is superior to idealism and may well challenge comparison with mysticism. The considerations which lead to this conclusion are, however, unfortunately technical.

III

I propose to conclude this article with some comments on Bertrand Russell's conception of the status of philosophical results. This is clearly set forth at the beginning of the book. Philosophy, he tells us, occupies a sort of No Man's Land between theology and science:

> Like theology, it consists of speculation on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All *definite* knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science; all *dogma* as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology.

Although the emphasis here is on *definite* knowledge, as the book proceeds, the qualifying epithet is lost sight of, until by the end of it we come to the uncompromising statement, "whatever can be known, can be known by means of science." The field in which scientific methods are declared to be inadequate "includes ultimate questions of value." Bertrand Russell adds that "things which are legitimately matters of feeling, lie outside its (science's) province," from which it appears that ultimate questions of value are matters of feeling and not of knowledge. Thus, I *feel* Beethoven's music to be better, or more beautiful, or more valuable than the song of the crooner, but I don't know it. As an illustration of this attitude take Russell's treatment of Aristotle's *Ethics*. He says, there are three questions which can be raised about an ethical system:

> (1) Is it internally self-consistent? (2) Is it consistent with the remainder of the author's views? (3) Does it give answers to ethical problems that are consonant to our own ethical feelings?

If to the first two questions the answer is negative, the philosopher can be charged with "intellectual error"; if to the third, "we have no right to say that he is mistaken; we have only the right to say that we do not like him." In other words, there are no ultimate ethical values which can be known, however inadequately, and invoked to arbitrate between different moral opinions. Questions of morals are questions of taste or, as Russell has it, of feeling and, in the absence of any external standard of value by reference to which it may be adjudged to be superior or inferior, one man's taste or feeling must, presum-

ly, be regarded as being as good or as bad as another's.

If this is the case with the ultimate values of morality, it is also, presumably, e case with the ultimate value of truth. Hence, it is little surprising to find ertrand Russell declaring at the beginning of his treatment of Plotinus that a philosophical system may be judged important for various different kinds reasons. The first and most obvious is that we think it may be true." I ve two questions: (i) Why, one wonders, is not the metaphysical truth of a ilosophy like the ethical truth of a philosophy just a matter of feeling? (ii) we can know of a philosophy that it is true, why does not our knowledge nstitute an example of knowledge which is both definite and other than ientific? If, on the other hand we can never *know* of a philosophy that it is ue, it is difficult to see how the question of its truth can be " the first and most vious reason " for its importance.

The fact is that, as the book proceeds, it is increasingly borne in on the ader that Russell is unable to sustain his professed view of the nature of ilosophical results. Again and again he suggests by implication, that knowdge does exist in regard to doctrines that have been historically maintained philosophers which is, I take it, a way of saying that we *do* have philosophical owledge.

In most cases, admittedly, what we appear to know in regard to a philophical doctrine is that it is mistaken, although occasions do arise when it pears that a doctrine is right. Now it seems to me nonsense to maintain in gard to such knowledge either that it is not definite, or that it is reached by e methods of science.

The truth, as I have remarked elsewhere, is that there is a deposit in Bertrand ssell's thought laid down in his earlier near-Platonic days which accords ry ill with the logical empiricism of his later period. In those earlier days maintained the independent existence of universals. These, long expelled om his logical universe, still like ghosts haunt his moral and aesthetic universes. These vestigial ghosts are, it is obvious, very uncomfortable inmates Bertrand Russell's present philosophical dwelling. Yet I am unable to see at they have ever been successfully laid and every now and then their dismfiting presence makes itself felt. The ghosts in question are, in general, tra-human facts which are neither spatial nor temporal, of which the human ind can have knowledge which is not obtained by means of science. But e most virulent of them are, I suspect, at bottom, nothing more nor less than e moral and aesthetic universals of traditional philosophy; are, in short, the miliar values, the good, the beautiful, the true.

Consider, for example, in this connection Bertrand Russell's attitude to " the ue ". Criticising William James, Bertrand Russell announces a principle of racity which is that we should " give to any hypothesis which is worth our hile to consider just that degree of credence which the evidence warrants." ow, the evidence which we are to consider as relevant is not confined to that

of which science takes account. It may, for example, be historical evidence. Why, Bertrand Russell asks, is it true to say that there was such a man as Columbus? And answers: "Because of a certain man of flesh and blood who lived 450 years ago." But this surely is to assert the existence of a fact which is not a physical fact, since it is in the past and Columbus himself is not now living, a fact which belongs not to the order of science but of history. It is with this fact that our belief is declared to be true because it *corresponds*.

The applicability of this criterion of truth is even extended to religion. When a man believes in God, says Bertrand Russell, "he believes in Him as he believes in the existence of Roosevelt, or Churchill, or Hitler—God, for him, is an actual Being."

It is not, therefore, meaningless to say that God exists and it is apparently possible that the belief in Him may be true. Moreover, if it is true, its truth consists in correspondence with a fact, the fact, namely of God's existence. But if God does exist, He is not a physical fact, nor is He discoverable by means of science. These are some examples of the concessions which Russell makes to what I have called his ghosts, by implying that we know facts which are not physical facts, which are not discoverable by men of science, but which nevertheless, exist, if only in order to give meaning to the many statements made throughout the book that our beliefs may correspond with them.

It is, I think, impossible to read such a passage as that on the effects of contemporary "cosmic impiety" quoted above, or to reflect upon the implications of Russell's denunciation of philosophers who allow their conclusions to be influenced by "moral considerations", or who use their "professional competence for anything except a disinterested search for truth"—they are said to be "guilty of a kind of treachery"—without drawing the conclusion that Russell, whatever he may say to the contrary, *does* believe that there is such a thing as philosophical truth, that such truth consists in the discovery and knowledge of facts about the universe, and that these facts are in no wise confined to the sort of facts which are discoverable by science. For it would surely argue a high degree of frivolity to say that a philosopher is guilty of treachery if he does not use his powers for "a disinterested search for truth," while at the same time holding that this search is for something that does not exist or, if it does, can never be known.

I conclude that Russell is right when he tells us that the fallacies of William James "spring from an attempt to ignore all extra-human facts," right, when he holds that these fallacies are part of "the subjectivistic madness which is characteristic of most modern philosophy," but wrong in supposing that such facts can only be discovered by means of science. If they are discoverable by some other means, what can those other means be except the methods of philosophy? From which it seems to follow that there is such a thing as philosophical truth and that it is at least possible that philosophy and philosophy alone may discover it.

WORLD MIRAGE

By William Rydal

THE mover of the Address at the opening of the new Parliamentary session —Mr. Henry Usborne—harked back to that flight of fancy in Mr. Bevin's foreign policy speech just a year previously when the Foreign cretary startled the House by sponsoring the idea of a World Assembly com-sed of delegates directly elected by the peoples. *Cui bono?* For such a nslation into specific—and specious—terms of Tennysonian rhetoric burkes e patent fact that democracy, which presupposes agreement on fundamentals, nply does not obtain in the community of nations. The facts of economic erdependence and strategy in the atomic age imperatively demand some pression of the federal principle, some form or other of supra-national thority. What is clear, however, is that the utopians, with their high-nding moralities—their comfortable nineteenth century habits of thought ojected into the international sphere—are still grossly underrating the ength and tenacity of Leviathan, the almighty "sovereign" State. Less n a fortnight after Mr. Usborne's exhortation Mr. Bevin following the ortive Great Power discussions on 'the veto', was constrained to say, in New rk, that Great Britain could not base her foreign policy on the constitution the Security Council but must fall back on old-fashioned military strategy, at is self-help. And the armaments and conscription policy of H.M.G. do t bear this out.

There we have the measure of the present gulf between glib idealism and m reality. The proceedings of the Second Session of the First Assembly, lowing upon the antics of the Security Council, have gone far to discredit e United Nations Organization as a present remedy for the world's dis-ntents. A certain amount of pessimism on this subject, however, may well be utary if thereby ordinary men and women are compelled to examine more sely the whole conception on which the present Charter is based, instead of asing after the illusions propagated by the perfectionists.

When, by a vote of forty-six to four, the Political Committee, on November quashed a "ruling" of its Chairman, M. Manuilsky—on an amendment to e Security Council's recommendation with regard to new members of the ganization—the Russian delegate blandly announced that the Soviet Union d not consider itself bound by the decision. In other words he stood four-uare on the rights of unabated State sovereignty. It was a less ostentatious t no less explicit formulation of the principle which M. Gromyko had

asserted by walking out of the Security Council's meeting at the time of its decision to maintain the Persian question on its agenda. While such a thing can happen it was unlikely that any debate on the use—or abuse—of the veto could do much good, and there need be no cause for surprise that the five-Power conversations on the subject initiated by Mr. Bevin proved abortive. Nor are the Russians by any means the only nigger in the woodpile. The U.S. Government have made it perfectly plain that they will accept no outside interference in their administration of the former Japanese-mandated islands. Field-Marshal Smuts, when the Assembly voted its disapproval of annexation of South-West Africa by the Union of South Africa, intimated that the incorporation would be taking place just the same. What the Russians have done by their maladroit behaviour, on sundry occasions at the Security Council (and at the Peace Conference), is in effect to expose to the public gaze a feature of all diplomatic negotiation—in the present context of inter-State relations—which, by tacit consent of the practitioners, had remained discreetly hidden.

A great deal of nonsense has in fact been talked about this so-called right of veto of the Great Powers which has been written into the constitution of the Security Council. So long as the United Nations, like the League of Nations, remains an assemblage of sovereign States (Article 2, para. 1 reads—"The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"), the non-binding character of any Resolution that may be voted is inherent in the whole scheme. International law has indeed consecrated the principle of *pacta sunt servanda,* but it has nothing to say about any procedure of debate and voting in committee. The traditional rule governing international conferences remains that binding decisions can be taken only by unanimous consent. It was precisely because of this persistence in the international domain of the "over-mighty subject"—to which Mr. Attlee some years ago made pertinent reference—that the attempt was made, first at Yalta and thereafter in the Charter of the United Nations, to translate into the terms of peace the leadership of the Big Three which had compassed victory in war. But once again, be it noted, unanimity was postulated—unanimity, that is to say, on the part of the Great Powers: the idea of a decision being reached on any matter affecting vital interests by majority vote did not come into question. M. Molotov was therefore perfectly entitled to affirm, as he did at the Peace Conference on October 14, that "it is not the right of veto which is involved. The question is whether we desire unanimity and co-operation among the great countries, unanimity in which all countries can take part, or whether we are unwilling to develop such co-operation." This is the letter of the law—of Dumbarton Oaks *via* the Yalta Conference (when it was Present Roosevelt who devised the appropriate voting formula, supported by Mr. Churchill) and Article 27 of the Charter elaborated at San Francisco. MM. Molotov and Vyshinsky have left us in no doubt about the Russian position. The British delegate, Mr. P. J. Noel-Baker, in his speech at the plenary session of the

sembly, went little further when he propounded the theme that members of : Security Council were not there merely to express individual opinions but ıst all the time seek to comport themselves so as to enable the Council to erate as a corporate body.

What this boils down to is that, within the context of undiminished State vereignty, any Resolution (other than enforcement measures under Chapter I) adopted by any organ of the United Nations is without compulsive force: ɔan amount to no more than a recommendation. And since on every major ue, on security-disarmament, on refugees, on Spain, there exists at present irreconcilable divergence between Russia and the Western democracies, the ited Nations machinery is for all practical purposes at a standstill. In the cumstances all talk of 'world government'—the phrase which recurs conntly in the mouths of Labour speakers (it was included in the rebels' motion) is nothing but dangerous word-spinning.

"Global" thinking—the new boss-word from across the Atlantic—on the ɔject of international relations does not stand up for a moment to any honest alysis of the actual facts and processes. Lord Samuel wrote recently* that arxism is "sheer emotion dressed up with logic and pretending to be scienti-": so liberal doctrine, in this domain, is sheer emotion (or aspiration) essed up with logic and pretending to be moral. The trouble is deep-seated, tending far beyond the demagogy of politicians. It springs from the rationstic or pseudo-scientific convention of denigrating nationalism, the habit of ecting attention to that which men, supposedly, have in common, whatever eir 'national' labels. It is of a piece with the facile habit of those who nk in words rather than actualities, of picking on certain abstractions like mocracy, communism or anti-Marxism and building on them castles in the , without due recognition of the fact that in every country they have a vastly ferent connotation, in accordance with that country's political maturity—they ssess a very different emotional content. H. G. Wells, with his cult of ankind and his world-conceits, was the arch-offender of our time in this spect. His manifold disciples, and the other lineal descendants of the eighenth century *philosophes*—good American liberals like Mr. Henry Wallace, r example—obstinately refused to face the plain fact that each national being lks a different language, metaphorically as well as literally, and that it is ese qualitative differences, *not* the superficial similarities, that make up the ork, wealth and happiness of mankind. It is high time that ordinary men d women were forewarned against this spurious cosmopolitanism, this illusion at there is a common language, a common moral currency of internationaln. (How few indeed, in any nation, have enjoyed that personal experience nich alone can provide the basis for a more-than-national consciousness! 'orld citizenship is just an intellectual bubble.) The liberals' prating of the ɔmmon man' is as meaningless, in the international sphere, as much of a

* *The Spectator*, November 22.

myth as the *homo proletarius* of the Marxists. For the real world in which we live—it cannot be too often recalled—is no Meccano structure devised by the human mind, it is compact of many mansions; each national unit representing a different historical phenomenon, conditioned by geography and climate, each having its own distinctive idiom which can only be comprehended by the initiated, that is those few who have taken the trouble to learn the language, to study its history, its social and psychological attributes.

What, then, are we to do? For we cannot just down our thinking tools and accept for all time things as they are, the persistence of that unmitigated international anarchy of which Lowes Dickinson, that wise old owl, was writing in 1914. (All talk of an imminent third World War, incidentally, is unrealistic in the extreme—it is the inversion, so to speak, of that wishful-thinking which I have tried to expose.) In this, as with so many other phenomena of human development, clarity begins at home.

The *sine qua non* of any improvement in the international outlook is to face the disagreeable facts. Foremost among those facts is Russia, playing a part on the world's stage which she has never played before, representing for suffering humanity a beacon of hope and achievement which it would be folly to deny. One point must be established straight away. The Soviet Union and the problem which it signifies is not Nazi Germany (or Japan) over again, and any policy or psychological attitude which starts from that assumption is misconceived. For, to use an expressive Americanism, the Russians with their Soviet democracy and the well-planned State, have " got something ". What constitutes the potency of their appeal is not so much any intrinsic power, military or economic, possessed by the U.S.S.R.—obviously, in terms of physical strength the colossus has been immeasurably weakened by the ravages of war—but the impetus, the *élan vital,* derived from the harnessing to that might of two dynamic forces: a compelling ideology—the Communists have gone a long way towards appropriating the Socialist myth in a majority of European countries, and not only those behind the iron curtain—and a social-revolutionary magnetism entirely appropriate to the twentieth century. As Professor Carr well says in his latest book:*

> Marxism has derived an enormous accretion of strength from the belief that the realization of its prediction is historically inevitable. To have history on one's side is the modern equivalent of being on the side of the angels.

Only, let it be noted, we have to deal with a *belief,* which is not necessarily borne out by the facts. And, in philosophical terms, the contemporary struggle is, as defined by Mr. Arthur Barker in *The Spectator,*† " between the materialist conception of man as an economic digit and that of man as something created by God to run his individual course." In short the Christian ethic is on trial as never before. But it is no use merely pitting faith against faith—

* *The Soviet Impact on the Western World.* Macmillan. 5s.
† November 15.

t would amount to lining up for a contest between Kremlin and the tican; free men will indeed derive their inspiration from Christendom (as ll as humanism) but they will find, and deserve, their salvation by their rks.

n political terms what does this mean? It means meeting the Russian llenge by establishing a rallying-point for all who are convinced that the ues of Western civilization—namely freedom of the individual, the dignity man, government by consent (which is the best simple definition of nocracy in the Western sense),—can be compounded with a system of social ll-being comparable with that which the Russians preach—and practise. d, first of all, there is a psychological adjustment to be made such as I have mbrated in another part of this article. To descant to the peoples of stern Europe on the blessings of Parliamentary democracy as practised in s country—which is the burden of so many diplomatic Notes to Poland, mania, Bulgaria, etc., is utterly futile; to prate of 'social democracy', in narrow connotation of the parties of the Second International is no less ose. No greater mistake could be made indeed by the Labour party in this ntry than to hitch its waggon to the paling star of Continental Socialism. ery opportunity should be seized, on the contrary, to establish contracts and, ere possible, co-ordination with the Communist and near-Communist sters of Eastern Europe—with Communists and M.R.P. in France. And, ticularly, is it necessary to avoid like the plague the sterile policy of anti-mmunism: for that reason the majority of our Catholic mentors, though nittedly representing just that community of thought across the frontiers ich is desired, rule themselves out of court as leaders for the task to-day. Before we of the West can usefully establish a *modus vivendi* with the mmunist zealots it is necessary to understand the idiom which they affect—d that may involve many hard years in the school of experience; before we a address ourselves to the fundamental problem of collaboration with the ssians, through UNO, in Germany or indeed on any major issue of inter-ional politics, we have to constitute, out of a shattered Europe, a spiritual rity that can be the agent of such collaboration.

The task is a prodigious one—and the difficulties are plain. But a beginning st be made. And for guidance we shall go not to the ideologues who im-diately lose contact with the *terra firma* of reality but to practical statesmen o have proved that they combine wisdom and practical experience with ion. Among these political leaders of our time four prominent Britons we pointed the way: Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Field-Marshal Smuts, d Lord Beveridge. And the House of Lords, in the debate on a motion by rd Vansittart on December 3, has made a most valuable contribution. Mr. urchill's words at Zurich were carefully chosen—though it has pleased the n of little faith, especially in France, to dismiss the speech as an old man's ting. After registering the present impasse of UNO the man who has

been since 1936, let it be recalled, President of the British Section of "The New Commonwealth",—and therefore may be considered to know what he is talking about—went on:

> What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European family or as much of it as we can and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build *a kind of* United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.

That Mr. Churchill himself is the last person who should set up as leader of a movement having as its aim such a Western Association goes without saying: it would inevitably "*ressembler comme un frère*" the Western bloc directed against the U.S.S.R. which has already acquired such a substantial bogey-value. The danger of such a miscreation has already induced the Netherlands Government to place on record its opposition at this juncture. Lord Beveridge, in his address at Rotterdam on December 2, chose to misinterpret Mr. Churchill's purpose, declaring that European federation, let alone world federation, was not a practical possibility, since federation was "only possible between countries with comparable political institutions and ideals." His plan was nothing more than a "freely-concerted" confederation of the nations of Western Europe. What Mr. Churchill, Field-Marshal Smuts and the others are concerned to do, however, surely is not to draw any blue print for Federal Union or to envisage a United States of Europe properly speaking but to establish here and now a beacon towards which the attention and energies of ordinary men and women who have entered into the possession of the European heritage may be directed: a regional grouping of like-minded nations such as is expressly recommended in the United Nations Charter. This theme of necessary decentralization through regional groups—by way of buttresses to the overall structure—was developed by Field-Marshal Smuts in his Address to the States-General at the Hague on October 11 and again in his speech to the Belgian Parliament on the 13th. What was new in the Smuts statements was the tacit assumption that for obvious reasons France, traditionally the standard-bearer of the European idea, cannot at present be counted upon for leadership and that Great Britain, if possible, or, failing that, countries of undoubted democratic integrity like Switzerland or Holland, should "set the ball rolling by forming a regional group with an appropriate council." And if, said the speaker, political advance was momentarily blocked, it would be well to start with a European economic council regarded as a projection of the Holland-Belgium-Luxemburg customs union. (It is not without interest to remark that the creation of such a body, at the instance of the Devastated Areas Sub-Committee of the Economic and Social Council, has now been approved by the U.N. Assembly.)

Much of the House of Lords debate turned on the place of Western Germany in any such enterprise of European integration. Haunted by immediate

olitical issues none of the speakers brought out sufficiently the advantage to e derived perhaps from the temporary abdication by France of the leader- ıip that would normally be hers: namely that emphasis can, as it should t this point, be laid on the spiritual and cultural bonds of the smaller nations f the European family, and also the pattern can be sought rather in the eculiar democratic triumph of the Swiss Confederation than in any facile ttempt to reproduce the forms of parliamentary democracy which we know ı Britain or France. But Lord Vansittart reiterated a pertinent if unpalat- ole home truth when he said that (as many wise Frenchmen realize), France ill not easily become a Great Power again unless she combines with us to ıake Western Europe a Great Power; Lord Lindsay did well to remind us ıat the secret of Hitler's appeal, outside his own country, was the promise— ıd in a measure, the performance—of the economic unification of Europe; ıd, finally, Lord Derwent, with his eyes on the policy resulting from Russia's eightened fear of contamination, demonstrated that the task of integration as indeed urgent, nothing less than a plain and unescapeable necessity. It as left to Lord Rennell to define significantly the essential area of Western uropean civilization's community of ideas by a reminder of the historical fact ıat the *limes* of the ninth century, the line of demarcation drawn by Charle- agne, curiously resembles the line separating West and East in Europe -day.

The spokesman of the Government, Lord Addison, was perhaps not as orthcoming as one might have hoped. It was perhaps too much to expect a rong lead at a time when any action on the part of H.M.G. affecting the .S.A. or Russia is like walking on eggs: but the fundamental justification, fter all, for taking the lead towards the constitution of a European polity is ıat for different reasons—Russia because of what we should call the primi- ve stage of her political development, America because of socio-economic ackwardness—the two principal Powers of to-day are precluded from use- ully contributing at present to the next phase of human progress. (It may may not be true, as the Soviet economist, Professor Varga, prophesies, that conomic feudalism in the U.S.A. will indubitably result in a violent slump 1948.) The Socialist rebels, free of such inhibition, had a great chance of ıowing themselves sensible of the great opportunity now open to this country ıd which is being missed: the full text of their letter to Mr. Attlee is indeed ı admirably critical document. But their case was vitiated by a doctrinaire dherence to "the principles of social-democracy", the assumption that there such a thing as a specifically "Socialist" foreign policy.

What the critics of Mr. Bevin might have said was, actually, set forth by ne of their number, Mr. R. W. S. Mackay, in a letter published in *The Manchester Guardian* on November 18. He reminds us that politically as ell as economically Great Britain must cut her coat according to her cloth. he is no longer the centre of the greatest empire in the world. The economic

developments between 1919 and 1939, the two world wars, the grant of independence to India, and our coming withdrawal from Egypt—all these factors and many more have completely changed our position, our power and our commitments. The British Commonwealth, moreover, is not economically self-sufficient, nor it is a political entity capable any longer of playing a world rôle. Britain is in fact to-day just a European State—and it behoves us to formulate a foreign policy accordingly.

Let us be thankful that the Prime Minister, no less than Mr. Churchill, has a complete grasp of first principles in this matter of establishing an effective world polity. He knows as well as any of the blueprinters that the centralizing of force alone will make possible the beginnings of disarmament—that the establishment of peace in a given area requires the transfer of an irreducible minimum of power (military and economic) to an authority superior to that of the single national State. He also realizes only too well that this thing cannot be done in our time on a world scale. With almost uncanny prescience Mr. Attlee saw our problem when summarizing Labour's peace aims in 1939:

> There must be acceptance of the principle that international anarchy is incompatible with peace and that in the common interest there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual States and endowed not only with rights over them but with power to make them effective, operating not only in the political but in the economic sphere. *Europe must federate or perish.* (My italics.)

—*nota bene* Europe, not 'the world'. It is not, of course, a question of setting up an alternative to UNO. We were right in establishing the skeleton institutions of an ordered polity on a world plane; and in the economic and social field much may be—is being—achieved. And we shall certainly be right in maintaining UNO and its organisms at the cost of blood, sweat and tears for our representatives at the Security Council, Assembly, etc.—even though it remains for some years little more than a tilting-yard for diplomatic jousts.

There is no need to despair. Let us give heed to the remarkable wisdom of Field-Marshal Smuts. In his speech to the Congress of American Industry in New York on December 6 he put the issue fairly and squarely between the Americans' individualist tradition and the new gospel of man propagated by Russia, but insisted that the fundamental differences between east and west need not mean anything like a recourse to arms to fight it out. Between east and west, he went on, lies a bridge—another great group which forms a real link between the Communist east and the individualist west. It is for us to build that bridge: and its name is "Europe". In the talk which he gave in the B.B.C.'s Third Programme on September 27, moreover, Field-Marshal Smuts supplied us with the appropriate perspective: in all writing and thinking on this subject it is necessary, as he says, to get our range right, to appreciate the time-factor. In international affairs, more than in any other sphere of human endeavour perhaps, the watchword must be patience, still more patience and patience yet again.

THE DANUBIAN SYMBOL

By Tibor Mende

TO the Danube's long record as an international problem a new distinction of dubious value has now been added. It has now become the microcosm of the factors producing the contemporary international malaise.

Let us imagine for a moment that world politics could be subjected to analysis of the kind applied to light or chemicals; that its constituent elements could, at any given moment, be projected into a sort of political spectrum. It might well be demonstrated that nearly all the major constituents of contemporary international relations are present in what is generally called the Danubian problem. What are they?

Taking its local implications, the river Danube is one of the great unifying factors offered by nature but rejected by bellicose man. Apart from this geographical factor, the Danube provides a perfect opportunity for joint economic and technical development to the benefit of all directly concerned, but instead it has been turned into an instrument of hostility by those who are only indirectly affected. Thus the Danubian question recently provided an example of the new depths reached in international ethics when it was used as a bargaining counter in the game of power politics. As far as Britain is concerned, the Danubian problem provides an illustration of the dual attitude governing post-war British foreign relations, as Britain upholds a principle in the Danubian area which she is endeavouring to deny in other theatres. Taking a global view, the Danubian problem is becoming a symbol of the changed pattern of power in the world after the Hiroshima explosion. Above all, however, the Danubian problem as a whole is symptomatic of the coincidence of a variety of factors which demonstrate the contemporary tendency towards regionalism.

Before a more detailed analysis of the implications of the Danubian problem is attempted, it will be useful to glance at the actual history of the Danube as an international waterway. The adaptation of the pre-war international agreement to conform with the post-war pattern of power is the formal problem.

With the progressive decay of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, the Danube river became a part of that vacuum which had to be filled by the new European balance of power towards the end of the nineteenth century. Since 1856 for the delta region, and since 1920 for the entire navigable course of

the river, two international commissions existed as the local expressions of this new European balance. The chief elements of the situation were the assertion of the national rights of the riparian States; the claim of the western Powers to enjoy equal rights in Danube trade and navigation; and the rivalry of the great Powers for the critical delta area.

The European Commission of the Danube was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 as a temporary expedient, to last only two years. Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey were its original members and it was a notable exception to the European principle of riparian control. Upon expiry of the two years it was supposed to be replaced, in conformity with the normal European system, by a body composed of the riparian States only. This new body was to control the whole course of the river from Ulm to the sea. This commission, however, never came into being as the European Commission was never dissolved. Not only was its existence prolonged but its privileges were steadily strengthened until it became the authority which made and enforced the rules of navigation on the stretch within its jurisdiction. Later its jurisdiction was even extended to the cities on the river to which the sea-going vessels ascended. Thus, the Commission, originally a mere engineering organization on the delta, acquired wide authority over work and navigation on the river, independent of the riparian States. The seat of the Commission was at Galatz whence its powers extended to the Black Sea. After 1918 only Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania remained as its members until the readmission of Germany in March 1939.

Above Braila, international control was established only after 1918. Following the seven months existence of the Danube Command under Admiral Sir E. Troubridge, in May 1919 an Inter-Allied Danube Commission was established under his chairmanship. Its task was to assist the re-establishment of Danubian traffic. Finally, Article 347 of the Treaty of Versailles provided that the Danube system from Braila to Ulm, including its navigable tributaries, should be placed under an international commission to carry on until a final Danube Statute was concluded. This international commission replaced the Inter-Allied Commission in July 1921 with Great Britain, France, Italy and the riparian States as its members. The work of these two Danubian Commissions continued right up to the outbreak of the second World War.

In September 1940 Germany summoned a conference in Vienna for the establishment of a provisional administration for the Upper Danube and, although Russia became a riparian State three months earlier, she was not invited. The Soviet protest and the negotiations which followed led to a Tass communiqué on October 26, 1940, declaring that the U.S.S.R. and Germany, with the assent of Italy, regard it

> necessary to liquidate the two Danubian Commissions and to replace them by a single Commission, composed of the States bordering the river and of Italy, whose powers will extend from Bratislava to the sea. The purpose of the Conference which will

meet at Bucharest will be to establish the provisional administration of the maritime Danube from Braila to the mouth of the river.

The British Government immediately protested in Moscow and refused recognition to any new arrangements. Meanwhile, at the Bucharest conference the Soviet Union insisted that the régime for the maritime Danube should be left exclusively to Rumania and herself. Upon this deadlock the conference adjourned indefinitely. Half a year later Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

Until 1918 Germany's interests in the Danube were represented by her Austrian ally. With the renewal of the *Drang nach Osten,* quite understandably, Germany developed direct concern in trade *along* the Danube though only her Balkan conquests brought Germany in direct conflict with the U.S.S.R. over the delta. Russia is traditionally hostile to international control of the Danube as it originated in her defeat in the Crimean War. Similarly, she has been consistently hostile to rivals in the delta area though for two long periods—between 1856 and 1878 and from 1917 till 1940—she was not a riparian Power. More recently the U.S.S.R. has developed an interest also in the upper reaches in proportion to her increasing preoccupation with security along her western approaches. Great Britain and France attached importance to their membership on the Commissions partly on commercial grounds and partly because it provided them with a political lever in that region. Their present-day concern, and especially that of the United States, is more clearly connected with their interest in the freedom of European and world trade.

As for the riparian States themselves, the Danube plays a decisive rôle in their trade and transport. The port of Vienna handled most of the river trade between north-west and south-east Europe and with 300,000 tons of river-craft Austria possessed the largest river fleet of all the riparian States. Through Bratislava a sizable portion of Czechoslovak trade passed each year and over one-third of all Hungary's transport was carried on the Danube. Yugoslavia, with the second largest river fleet, largely depended for its communications on the Danube. Similarly important proportions of Bulgarian trade went through that country's river ports. Rumania's two major inland ports, Braila and Galatz, handled some sixty per cent. of Rumania's imports and exports. The total Danubian traffic in an average pre-war year amounted to some three-and-a-half million tons. At present, with roads and bridges out of repair, railways only partially reconstructed and with growing interstate trading in the region, Danubian traffic has only increased in importance for all the riparian States.

To-day, neither of the two original Danubian Commissions is able to function but, in the British view, they are technically still in existence.

At the Paris Conference, where the Danube question was discussed in connection with the peace treaties with Germany's former satellites, the United States, Great Britain and France stood for the principle of equality of oppor-

tunity while the Soviet Union and the former riparian allies advocated exclusive riparian control.

Speaking at a plenary session, in connection with the treaty with Rumania, Mr. Bevin said (October 10, 1946): "I want to see the Danube as a great artery of commerce, as free as the sea . . . . I do not wish to see this policy of exclusion damming the broad stream of peaceful commerce . . . . "; and he added: "We cannot but feel that the Soviet proposal . . . . is not only a retrograde step, but a deliberate discriminatory action against their allies . . . ." "It seems, indeed, a little strange," Mr. Bevin continued, "that after all our sacrifices we should be placed in a worse position than we held before the war." He urged the conference to accept the French proposals providing for free navigation on the Danube, its navigable tributaries and connecting canals, and for the calling of an early conference to draw up a permanent régime. The attitude of the United States was summed up by Senator Vandenberg in a commission debate (August 30, 1946) when he said that U.S. interests in Danube navigation were both "temporary and basic". Commerce could not prosper along the river as long as it was at the mercy of various unco-ordinated, restrictive and discriminatory administrations which responded to the local judgments of the eight national jurisdictions through which the Danube flowed. Mr. Gladwyn Jebb, speaking at the same meeting, emphasized the long history behind international control of Danube navigation and insisted that the riparian States should attend a conference to draw up the final statute. "For our part," Mr. Jebb remarked, "we cannot admit that Rumania, who declared war against us in 1941, should by that mere fact be allowed to deny us right which we freely exercised before the war was declared." As a whole, the French have supported these British and American pronouncements.

The Soviet Union as well as White-Russia, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia expressed the opposite point of view with equal unanimity. Their arguments concentrated on the motives of the western attitude, minimizing the importance of historical precedent. Dr. Hajdu, the Czechoslovak delegate, declared (August 30, 1946) that the control of the Danube was a matter for the riparians and his country intended to be "master in its own house". Mr. Kardelj of Yugoslavia "absolutely rejected" the western proposals which "had been adopted in committee by the votes of those countries, situated thousands of miles from the Danube, while all the Danubian countries refused to accept such a decision." He viewed the debate as "a struggle for imperialistic positions" and hoped that these "dishonourable remnants of the past" will be "cleared from the Balkans and the Danube basin."

Mr. Molotov (October 10, 1946) emphasized the changed international background since the 1856 Danube Commission was established and accused the western Powers of imperialist motives in their advocacy of equal opportunity on the Danube. "If you compare Rumania or Yugoslavia with the

osition of the United States, if you give equality of opportunity, what will main of their industries? All these could be purchased by American capital a short time, which would then become master in those countries." He luded to the possibility of applying the same principles to other international aterways, among them the Suez and Panama Canals and emphasized the anger of "dollar diplomacy" in backward countries. Speaking two days ter at a plenary session, Mr. Manuilsky, head of the Ukrainian delegation uestioned the sincerity of the western Powers' advocacy of "free trade" on ie ground that Great Britain and France, when they drew up the 1921 Conention on the Danube régime, did not think of inviting the Soviet Union. le alleged that the present policy of the western Powers amounted to the ish to continue "the 1921 line, directed against the interests of the Soviet Inion." A few weeks later the Soviet economist Varga, writing in the *New imes,* dealt with the Danubian question. Concluding that only an insignifiant portion of the western Powers' trade was connected with the Danubian ountries, he posed the question: "Why do Great Britain and the United tates wish at all costs to interfere in questions of Danubian navigation? . . . or nearly a century Great Britain has taken part in the Danubian Commission. She does not want to understand that the situation in the Danubian tates has changed, that from semi-colonies they have transformed themelves into independent States . . ." As for America: "Some American oliticians, dizzy with success, think that they are entitled to interfere as they ike in the domestic affairs of other countries. Behind the phrases about reedom of navigation on the Danube and similar demands, is hidden the wish of imperialist circles to arrest the democratic, progressive development of he Danubian countries and to restrict their independence."

Varga also emphasized that "the contradiction between the words of the J.S. representatives, expressing their anxiety for the development of Danube navigation, and their actual activities is strikingly evident." He was referring, of course, to the detention of Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Hungarian ships by the Americans in Austria and Germany. When the Germans were expelled from the Danubian countries they seized nearly all the river craft of those countries and took them up river. On May 21, 1946, to the accompaniment of unconvincing talk about a "security threat" and acting on instructions from the State Department, the U.S. Army seized 372 of the river craft, while a further 200 to 300 in American controlled waters were to be 'demobilized". A State Department official commenting on this seizure of property, a substantial part of which belonged to the U.S.'s former allies, bluntly said that "we have the boats and they have the river, but the boats can be traded for concessions." When one of the States concerned, Yugoslavia, after repeated direct requests to the U.S. military authorities in Frankfurt, asked the UNO Economic and Social Council on August 13, 1946, to examine the question of the confiscations, Mr. Acheson—U.S. Acting Secretary

of State—made the revealing statement that this subject was part of " a very much larger matter—the question of the freedom of navigation on the Danube." When after innumerable bitter public complaints, the boats were returned to their rightful owners, this unsavoury episode was brought to a close by Mr. Acheson's admission (November 10, 1946) that the U.S. step was explainable on the ground that " it had been impossible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union concerning free navigation on the Danube."

So much for the facts of the Danubian dispute. Even such a bare outline should suffice to indicate that something more is involved than the inoffensive passage of small river craft up and down the " Blue Danube ".

Reporting these arguments from the Paris Conference, the Special Correspondent of *The Times* wrote (August 13, 1946):

> In opposing the British proposals to grant foreign interests the same advantages that they enjoyed before the war, the Russian delegation have been led step by step to an almost open attack on the capitalist system and a defence of controlled economy. The British, in resisting this attack, found themselves arguing the case of liberalism and free competition.

At the last general elections the majority of the present British legislators have argued before their electors against these principles and were elected on that mandate. Moreover, American objections to the Imperial Preference system are based on precisely the same premises as censure of the planned economic relations which the Soviet Union is instituting in her trading with the Danubian countries. Conversely, the arguments used by Great Britain against the U.S. at the recent International Trade Conference in London, are identical in principle with the arguments employed by the U.S.S.R. and the Danubian States against the implications of free Danubian traffic and trading advocated, among others, by Great Britain. After the experiences of the last decades it is unlikely that, even if acting without any foreign pressure, the Danubian countries could accept the political conditions attached to American financial assistance without corresponding security of American markets, thus compelled to face the renewal of past economic hazards experienced earlier in their dependent rôle as debtors. What the principle of equality offered to them really means they had opportunity to study in the implications of the recent U.S.-Chinese trade agreement.

To recognize the present motives of American financial help no longer needs analytical insight. As Mr. Charles Dewey, vice-President of the Chase National Bank remarked in the debate on the loan to Britain, it was " the only hope of preventing a world-wide movement towards state-controlled trade . . ." And if that hope materializes? It would mean that the European countries, including Great Britain, would become dependencies of the essentially nineteenth century American economic chaos, which can only survive within her independent continental economy in which foreign trading plays only a subordinate rôle.

Sensing the general world-wide desire for planned economy and full em-

loyment, wartime idealism has produced many a plan to approach regional conomic problems rationally. Prominent among them were plans for a kind f Danubian T.V.A. holding out the hope of an ordered solution for the ur- ent needs of that under-industrialized and over-populated area of Europe. As the practical approach only too often lags behind the good intentions nspired by idealism, international investment boards were visualized, offering onstructive work for modest returns. The end of lend-lease and the dis- olution of UNRRA marked the formal burial of these hopes. Instead one ears of American schemes of establishing a number of Financial Corporations n the Danube Valley under a sort of Control Commission, set up for the whole length of the river and operating with aid from the International Bank as a part of the Bretton Woods plan. Thus, instead of a constructive approach, the intention appears to be to prevent planned economy in a region whose disruptive diseases only a regional economy can cure. Yet, it is pre- cisely from her advocacy of a regionally planned economy that the Soviet Union derives her main strength in the Danubian region. It is a common- place to argue that in these days agricultural peoples are in perpetual bondage o industrial ones. The Danubian area has, for perhaps the first time in its modern history, passed under the influence of a Power with whose interests industrialization of the region is not inconsistent.

The social significance of the collapse of international free trade, and its symbol the gold standard, was that it opened the way to social transform- ation within States whose social and property structure was formerly " guaranteed " by the fear of international financial sanctions. The convic- tion, gaining ground in Britain, that she ought to develop regional and bi- lateral trading arrangements as a condition of independence and undisturbed social transformation, is parallel with the Danubian States' desire to achieve *their* social transformation independent of the retarding political con- ditions usually attached to foreign financial support. By stretching the radius of her economic influence, as a by-product of her security policy, the U.S.S.R. is enlarging the circle within which social transformation and regional inter- dependence can take root. Penetration within that circle of financial interests opposed to regional planning must appear to her as a threat to her security and the wilful obstruction of the newly-developed ties between her and her Danubian neighbours.

The United States is to-day the only country whose interests commit her to the re-establishment of the nineteenth century universalist conception of free-trade with its inevitable corollaries of slumps and mass-unemployment. The sole alternative to-day is in regional planning. In the emerging pattern of world society Great Britain and the Soviet Union, with their regionalist interests, have a common denominator in their motivating principles. While, in vastly different ways and with equally different methods, they both find themselves in transition towards new, regional forms, the U.S.—for the time

being—stands apart and alone wedded to her utopian conception of the resurrection of a discarded multilateralism.

Liberal capitalism, as a universalist society, stands abandoned by a humanity striving for better solutions. Its whole pattern is so completely shattered and disorganized that in our plans for survival we have to discard or reshape many of its old institutions, rules and instruments. American administered artificial respiration to resurrect this universalism will only deepen the cleavage already existing between the rival ideologies. What it cannot do is to erase from the memories of multitudes the tragic effects of the ideal the U.S. stands for to-day.

We are well on the way towards a new world pattern in which the various pieces of the global puzzle will gradually fall into co-existing regional systems. They may emerge as the next phase in humanity's forward march towards an eventual, future, larger unity. To arrest this transition without providing a workable alternative, or to offer one which can give only temporary succour, is inviting disaster. The Danubian contest is only a side-show, a small symbol of the larger issue.

BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

By George Catlin

IN the history of our times it may well be that the French Elections, which bring the Communist Party so near to power in France, are more important for Europe than the American November election results, which are briefly important as indicating a decision to come two years hence and as meanwhile stultifying decision in American politics.

Nevertheless the American results received ample attention in the British press, with editorials in all leading journals. It may be profitable, before making any judgment on the future political situation which they condition, to review briefly this comment.

The London correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) rather optimistically suggested that the comment had followed Party lines, the Government press being pro-Democrat, and the Conservative and Liberal press being pro-Republican. Even on the evidence supplied by himself this was not the case. The advent of the Republicans to power in the House of Representatives and Senate was received with little less than dismay even in the Conservative press which should have been ideologically favourable. One commentator went so far as to say that, mysterious though the lands beyond the Iron Curtain" might be, their mystery was not much more astounding than the inexplicable workings of the American Constitution.

It is generally recognized in Britain that, if there is a difference of principle between the Democrat and Republican Parties, noboby knows beforehand what the difference is. Nevertheless the Conservative *Spectator* pointed out that, if divisions of economic principle cross Party lines, the present election results are a victory for elements which will have a policy distinctive from what has gone before. There may not be much difference in principle; but it is that little which makes all the difference.

" The Democrats carry on," said *The Spectator,* " with the removal of price controls with a certain amount of uneasy grumbling. The Republicans would do it with a yell of delight." Coming from a journal of which the Party theme is that controls should be removed in the name of liberty, this makes very odd reading. The British Tory shows himself these days, by comparison with his American brother, as already half a Socialist. It is of course true that Herbert Spencer said that he always was, whereas the American Republican tends to embrace still the theories of Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics.* The pet Russian thesis about the inevitable contradictions of capitalism, showing themselves in

internecine jealousies, almost seems to be justified.

The explanation lies in the economic embarrassment which Britain expects to experience when public negotiations have to comfort the rough and tumble of private enterprise, instead of being a matter for gentlemen's agreements on political grounds between Western governments.

The Economist commented, with mixed feelings, that the results marked "the end of positive American leadership." The pro-Government *Daily Herald* bluntly headed its editorial on the American Elections "Bad News." *The Observer* remarked that a semi-Socialist Britain will be praying for the success of this latest experiment in Capitalism, owing to the extent of British dependence upon the American economy. All somewhat prematurely assume a swing towards American isolationism in sentiment, if not in strategy. By these expressions they tend to provoke what they fear.

Mr. Christopher Hollis, High Tory M.P. for Devizes, wrote "America, with her vast productive capacity, can probably ride through another depression. It is far less certain how far we in our wounded condition can do so . . . . There is little chance now of any effective reduction of American tariffs, and without such reduction there is no obligation on us to reduce preferences." Mr. Hollis, as much as any Marxist, clearly anticipates boom followed by unemployment in America.

All commentators indeed reassure their readers that there will be continuity of foreign policy in the United States, and that Mr. Truman has successfully avoided the catastrophic error of President Wilson. The uneasy doubt which they express is whether foreign policy can be discussed successfully in detachment from a financial policy which may alienate world public opinion.

One of the shrewdest comments came from Professor D. W. Brogan, in the independent *Observer.* He writes: "We have to begin again, and it is to be hoped that Downing Street is hastily considering who can be found to talk to Republicans in something like their own language or, at least, to listen to them without too much doctrinaire impatience." He is alone in acutely pointing out that in nothing was Mr. Truman worse advised than in anticipating unemployment at least so soon after the war. It was "a prophesy that was ludicrously wrong and left the President's face red, but brought no answering blush to the cheek of Mr. Secretary Wallace, chief spokesman of this view."

The Manchester Guardian, reflecting upon the deadlock to be anticipated during the next two years, somewhat smugly commented that the British system provides "a better reflection of the popular will and a more efficient instrument of government." That the American system, which deliberately prefers no action by Government to wrong action, exemplifies a system of checks, perhaps dangerous in the stresses of our united modern world but especially beloved by the Liberal and Whig philosophers in a more spacious age, escapes the notice of the Liberal *Guardian.*

No lesson is drawn by either Liberal or Tory press from the Republican

ctory for the benefit of the domestic situation in Britain. Such lessons are)parently not for import. Liberals and Conservatives alike should by rights e drunk with pleasure about this victory of the old *bourgeois* ideas, but they rtainly are not. Rather they wait on the brink like men expecting a cold)uche as they dive into the unknown. Admittedly it is disconcerting to note iat Mr. John L. Lewis, as much as the American Chamber of Commerce, has s own interpretation of *laissez faire* or " No Government in business."

One reflection which seems to have escaped general notice is the pity that Wendell Willkie, whose internationalism was never in question, was not ected as Republican President in 1940—in which event the prospects of con-nuity of policy, domestic and foreign alike, would be far more rosy. On the hole the British Government of the day was so far bewitched by the magnet-m of the then occupant of the White House as to have done less than justice) Willkie. Some regrets are, however, now expressed that the prospects of Governor Stassen are not brighter.

If the British Government finds itself tarred, in American opinion, with the rush of pro-Rooseveltism the fault, through lack of foresight, is its own. Mr. Taft or Mr. Bricker will probably give it small comfort although Britain, nlike France, is not likely yet to embrace the waiting Slav comrade with in-iscreet and uncritical fervour and with memories of the old *Entente.*

The Democrat defeat was explained in the Conservative *Sunday Express* as nore " an explosion of resentment than an approval of Republican policy." resident Truman pleased neither the Right Wing nor the Left. *Time and Tide* saw the vote " not so much one for the policies of the Republican Party s against the Democrat lease of power."

Certainly there is an odd irony that the democratic love of change which imultaneously put Conservative Mr. Hoover out and Radical Mr. Roosevelt in n America, put Radical Mr. Macdonald out and Conservative Mr. Baldwin in n Britain; and likewise, almost simultaneously, put Mr. Truman in effect out n America, and Socialist Mr. Attlee into the place of Mr. Roosevelt's wartime olleague, Tory Mr. Churchill, in Britain. It has a sobering effect on the nthusiasm which sees one set of solutions appealing to democracy the world ver.

The Left-Wing *New Statesman,* prophesying a slump " of 1921 dimensions," ook as moral that an America in which " liberal voices will be stifled " must e left to its fate; but that as touching the slump, "we must redouble our efforts o cushion a Socialist Britain from its impact." The ever judicious *Times* wrote editorially, with more caution: " A bi-partisan policy is only made possible by holding a delicate balance between opposing forces, and it will be he national consequence of the electors' choice that this balance . . . will tend o incline rather more to the Right."

It would perhaps be nearer the truth to say that the Elections are understood n Britain as a repudiation of the Roosevelt policy and an endorsement of that of Senator Vandenberg. Superficially a rebuff for Russia and a foretaste of a

'toughening up,' actually it is no small embarrassment for countries rather nearer to Russia than the United States. Unless the ensuing policy is pursued with subtlety it is likely to cause much difficulty to Mr. Bevin and equivalent encouragement to his Left critics.

If, having reviewed the British Press comment of the moment, we now take a broader view, certain considerations will emerge.

The first is that almost all commentators assume that the Democrats are peculiarly Anglophil, at least by comparison with the Republicans. This is an illusion unwarranted by the history of the two major parties—and, moreover, to-day a dangerous illusion.

Even Dr. Brogan, usually so excellently informed if often unduly dogmatic in judgment, does not in his comment adequately allow for the historical record of the Republican Party which, while fairly consistently cautious in its support of abstract internationalism and the Atlantic Charter philosophy, has, perhaps by compensation, pursued a policy less critical of Britain than the Democrats until the accession of Franklin Doosevelt. Mr. Hoover was attacked by the Democrats as too pro-British to be trusted.

Woodrow Wilson stood stiffly on the universalist solutions of the Covenant in international affairs. On the record he was not especially pro-British. The satisfactory Washington Naval Agreement which was really decisive for Anglo-American relations in the new era, and which decided that parity and co-operation should be substituted for competition and rivalry, was carried through under the Harding Administration and by the diplomacy of Charles Evans Hughes. Mr. Henry Wallace, in his recent exposition of a detached international policy, and Mr. Elliott Roosevelt are here in the lineal succession of the Wilson tradition.

In view of the words of Mr. R. H. S. Crossman and his fifty-six co-signatories to the effect that the only alternative to an ideologically Socialist foreign policy is " an otherwise inevitable conflict between American capitalism and Soviet Communism in which all hope of world government would be destroyed," there is something ironic in Mr. Elliott Roosevelt's complaint in *As He saw It* :

> We (the Americans) vacated the vitally important rôle of operating as a mediator between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the only two nations whose security interests clash to-day.

That President Franklin Roosevelt was above all competitors the friend of Britain is a firmly established part of the Roosevelt myth overseas. It was, of course, the case that he was an intimate friend of Mr. Churchill's and that this happy personal relationship deeply influenced policy—although Elliott Roosevelt's book shows that even this can be exaggerated.

In point of fact, it was Willkie, not Roosevelt, who advocated in 1942 a total social and economic union of the States and the British Commonwealth, including interchangeable citizenship. This fact is so little known that it is worth requoting. The advocacy occurred in an interview given in January, 1942, to

ne *Sunday Express*. Mr. Willkie then proposed:

1. An economic and social union of the United States and the British Empire, which in effect will constitute a bond of brotherhood linking the English-speaking peoples of the world.
2. The abolition of all immigration barriers between countries comprising the British Commonwealth of nations and the United States, giving to holders of American passports in any part of the British Empire and of British passports in the United States the full value of citizenship.

It may indeed be said that Wendell Willkie was no typical Republican, and nat the Willkie-ite ex-Governor Stassen of Minnesota is unlikely to get the Republican nomination. Frankly I regard Mr. Stassen as the ablest candidate hat the Republicans have and as the man with the most vision of any in the Republican ranks with whom I am acquainted. It will be fatal for America f the Republicans, in this perilous period, put into the White House another Coolidge, to cite no living statesman. One may take some comfort from the act that Willkie himself was a most unlikely candidate for the nomination, with all the odds against him. Nevertheless he obtained it. Moreover no rea of the country has been so consistently Republican as the Middle West, nd that it is in this Middle West that Progressive Republicanism is dominant.

However, just as nowadays Democrat Presidents seldom come from the Solid South, precisely because its pro-Democrat vote can be counted on under all ircumstances, so states such as New York, Ohio and California will play more part than the Middle West or even Illinois in the Republican selection. Even so, and if it be admitted that Willkie expressed views far bolder on Anglo-American relations than any other of his Republican colleagues, nevertheless he tradition of the Republican Party is, as distinct from Democrat universalism, pro-British and Western. This is amply borne out and documented by Mr. Forrest Davis, in his excellent book *The Atlantic Community*, with its brilliant historical review, as well as by Walter Lippmann in his brief and lucid *U.S. Foreign Policy*.

The idea that a Republican-shaped policy will be anti-British is one of those beliefs that, unwarranted in itself, is yet likely to be self-fulfilling. Much the worst American policy for the world will be no policy at all. It is this which is what really has to be feared. The next worst policy would be one of an uncalled for Anglo-American misunderstanding. It is as foolish for the British to lament over Mr. Truman as for the Americans to feel that all was over with Britain when Mr. Churchill fell from power. What economic deal Britain gets from the Republicans will largely depend upon how Britain relates itself to the Republicans.

It may, of course, be said that Britain does not welcome a Western or pro-British policy in America but only a universalist plan or, in the alternative, the middle-of-the-road policy of a Western European bloc. It may be true that the sheet-anchor of our international relations should be that of giving support to the United Nations Charter and to the rule of law. But circumstances may

well so develop that UNO policy has only limited applicability. Mr. Bevin gave warning in late November that he had gravely to consider whether, in the light of Russian alternative views, he could any longer recommend the British people to trust unqualifiedly to the Security Council for its security.

A Western bloc or 'middle way,' which meant only British leadership of Belgium and Holland, is (as *The Observer* has pointed out) not very encouraging. One that included France and reconstituted (as many, like Mr. K. Zilliacus, would like) the Triple Entente could immediately become an anti-American bloc along with M. Thorez, with Britain in the first bombing line. It would be suicide to repudiate the proffered hand of friendship, even were armed neutrality considered as an alternative. It may well be that taking it could cause the realistically-minded Slav bloc to reconsider its intransigence in UNO matters, and its periodic tendency to revert to Lenin's description of the Geneva assembly as a " den of thieves " with which no self-respecting Marxist could collaborate. Indeed the Byrnes-Bevin policy has already led here to much salutary reconsideration. If, however, the hand is taken by Britain, it must be in honest friendship and not with cards up the sleeve. And if it is taken there must be as much genuine determination, as Dr. Brogan very shrewdly implied, to understand sympathetically the West, shaped as the electors have decided by a large democratic majority that it shall be, as to understand the East.

In the present misunderstanding there is a strong note of irony which may easily become tragedy. Its character is indicated by a shocked letter from an American correspondent in *The Times* endeavouring to explain what he meant by that American tradition of liberty so magistrally expounded by de Tocqueville, with his brilliant comparison, a century ago, of America and Russia as the two future great Powers of the world. We may say indeed with Professor Harold Laski, in his article on " The Meaning of the U.S. Elections " (*Palestine Post,* November 10, 1946):

> What H. G. Wells called the " raucous voices " are now baying with an intensity hardly heard since the fantastic days of the Liberty League. And the pattern is an ugly one. For while its main framework is supplied by the demands of business, it attracts to its side every sort of interest which seeks to arrest the progress of reform . . .
>
> Not least, there is very real danger in the recent institutionalization of military and naval power. The authority of the Combined Staff to go over the heads of the two Secretaries and operate under the direct authority of the President creates the real danger that there will be lacking that continuity of civilian control over service castes which is fundamental in a democratic society. And that authority is the more dangerous because the nature of modern war brings the soldier and the sailor into relations with big business the results of which in the absence of strong civilian control, were shown in their naked simplicity in Nazi Germany.

Or we may say that the words of de Tocqueville (*De la Démocratie en Amérique,* II) still hold true: *" Pour atteindre son but, l'Américain s'en repose sur l'intérêt personnel, et laisse agir san les diriger la force et la raison des individus. Le Russe concentre en quelque sorte dans un homme toute la*

rissance de la société."

To *The Times* American correspondent it seemed incredible that anybody ould doubt that America believed in liberty and freedom from the shackles control; or that the Republican victory showed the gratifying uprising of e American people against the first beginnings of the servile state. To others Europe this victory seemed the triumph of anti-Soviet reaction; and, because ch, therefore proto-fascist and tainted with Nazi ideas. It is difficult to asp that it is the same political phenomena that both sets of observers are scussing. There seem to be no connections between the two descriptions. ne astonished American writing his letter of Cobdenite Liberal explanation *The Times* and Professor Laski seem to live in two different worlds with fferent languages where the same words mean opposite things.

The explanation is that both observers suffer from a common fault and a ry un-Anglo-Saxon one. They suffer from the fault of the doctrinaire. any Americans have not yet realized that there is a doctrinaire Cobdenism st as there is a doctrinaire Marxism—and that the one is no more realistic an the other . There is a fetish of ' getting rid of controls,' not because of e observed results, which are by no means always too good, but for *a priori* asons. There is an obstinate unwillingness to admit that the issue between ublic enterprise and private enterprise is a pragmatic one of the well-being of e common man; and that the odds are that a mixed economy is best—to admit at even British conservatism had had to accept the notion of ' strategic planng ' (a somewhat militaristic word for industry), and that even ' strategic anning ' has to get down to detail somewhere.

Americans have been so lucky—first so isolated and then so powerful—that ey have been the last to feel the pressures that apply to an over-crowded, overarful and war-devastated humanity. It may be that this over-crowding will ase; that our problems will be of man shortage, not unemployment; and that hat will be required is not nationalization, but internationalization, to secure ternational socialism and civilian control, as distinct from national socialism id military control. But these reflections carry us too far. For the moment ie first need of the Republican Party is to abandon economic dogma and to vise party doctrines in the light of the human situation of 1946. If it does ot, then Mr. John L. Lewis, whatever starvation he may spread in Europe, will e regarded, at least by Communists, in Europe as a hero. It is perhaps unortunate that it is not France, where M. Thorez so acclaims him, but Germany, hich directly suffers the effect of his action. There must be a patent relation etween the liberties of which the Republicans talk and the security of the ommon man within the framework of law and control. The total abandonient of controls is probably not the method to make manifest this relation in world which still has to campaign for peace by some of the same organization y which it campaigned for war.

Beyond these different views lies the real America which Cobdenite and

Marxist see through their respective spectacles—according to the one an upstanding Republic of men of enterprise; according to the other a reactionary pluto-oligarchy menacing the world with schemes for monopoly. Here is a land which enjoys individual freedom, even to the point of licence of strong against weak, even to the point of what Lincoln called "liberty according to the wolves' dictionary." Here is one of the few lands of what used to be called "conditional anarchy," where the Government is regarded as public enemy number one, and where Hampden-like men resolve that the power of the State "has increased, is increasing and must be diminished." Here, in however distorted and anarchic forms, the principle is still maintained that the total of individuals take priority over the State. This may be a chaotic force, actually lowering the standard of living of the people at home and abroad—or it may be an emancipating force such as no police state, with its political prisoners digging canals for the greater military security of the sacred régime, can ever possess. And it should be remembered that, if the party of McKinley and Harding, then also the party of Lincoln, the Emancipator, and of Willkie, the apostle of One World, was the Republican Party. Its party chiefs have gravely to consider how it shall appear abroad; and those abroad have to consider how they will relate themselves to it.

AIR POWER IN ACTION

By Douglas Colyer

WHEN the Wrights built the first heavier-than-air craft and flew it at Dayton, Ohio, just forty-three years ago, the world was quick to grasp some at least of the potentialities of this triumph over gravity nd the next few years saw tremendous strides in the building of flying achines and the production of suitable engines to propel them. But there n have been few people at that time who foresaw the possibilities for destruc- on which the Wrights' triumph had put into men's hands and which within ttle more than a generation would bring European civilization to the brink ruin.

In the years between 1903 and 1914, most of the first-class powers formed viation corps to aid their surface forces in the collection of intelligence con- rning enemy dispositions. Under the compulsion of the war of 1914-1918, owerful air arms developed out of these modest reconnaissance forces and the ar ended with the chief belligerents in possession of air fleets containing a umber of specialized types of aircraft designed for the various functions hich they were called upon to perform. Yet, looking back upon the first World War, it is clear that the use of air-power was a haphazard business and hat the aircraft was regarded as no more than an ancillary to the surface orces.

The period following the war was, therefore, one of acute controversy. There were those who argued, with a good deal of justification on the evidence f the past, that aviation as a military weapon could produce the best results nly if it were used at the behest of the commanders of the surface forces, on he land or on the sea. On the other hand, there were those, like the Italian Douhet, who believed that aviation had made all but air forces obsolete and oresaw the wars of the future being decided by air action alone. Time and xperience have shown that the truth lies between these two extremes.

Technically, the extension of warfare into a third dimension has altered its haracter tremendously. It has solved a number of problems and has posed many new ones. There can be few reasonable men who would still cling to he belief either that air forces are merely the ancillaries of surface forces or hat air forces have rendered surface forces unnecessary.

But it is in the nature of warfare itself that third dimensional war has made fundamental change. The period of limited wars has gone for ever and, n its place, has come the era of conflict between whole nations, in which every

individual, man, woman and child, is exposed to attack and the struggle becomes one not between the armed forces of the belligerents so much as between the stamina and the industrial potential of the warring nations. Whatever may be the future developments in the types of weapons employed, the 'total' character of war will remain as the direct result of the increased range given to projectiles by the conquest of the air. The war through which we have just passed has made clear once and for all the implications of modern warfare.

While the victorious nations were groping towards an understanding of the problems of air warfare, the losers in the war of 1914-1918, whose military air force had been outlawed and destroyed, were busily engaged in building up a healthy civil aviation and closely following the controversies between the rival schools of thought regarding the rôle of air forces in modern war. For years prior to the rise of the Nazis to power, German officers and technicians were attending courses at military aviation establishments outside Germany, while their leading designers were turning out military aircraft in foreign countries or experimenting at home with types which were the direct predecessors of many of their most successful fighters and bombers of the 1939-1945 war. Though many of these activities were well known to a number of non-Germans they were treated with good-humoured tolerance by a generation unwilling to face the possibility of another war. But, in retrospect, it is clear that there were many in Germany, even in the years immediately following defeat, who were determined that when the chosen hour struck the Fatherland would make another, and this time a successful, bid for the domination of the world.

When, therefore, Hitler judged, correctly, that the time had come when he could afford to cast off his last pretences of adherence to the air clauses of the Versailles Treaty, he had ready to his hand a well-established aircraft industry, directed by a bevy of brilliant and experienced designers and a corps of well-trained officers and technicians to man their products. At the head of his newly-exhibited *Luftwaffe* was his second-in-command, Hermann Goering, a fighter ace of the last war and a man possessing both vision and drive, together with a number of less solid qualities. Under Goering were two men well suited to the task in hand, Milch, the organizer, who had been director of the *Lufthansa,* and Udet, the brilliant pilot and technician, who had designed and constructed a number of aircraft and was later himself to win the world's speed record for Germany.

This trio built up the *Luftwaffe* into an instrument of war which, with the help of Goebbel's propaganda, struck terror into the hearts of foreign governments prior to the outbreak of war and came within a short distance of giving Germany the victory once the conflict was joined.

The story of its successes and blunders and of its final extinction has been told by Wing Commander Asher Lee in his book *The German Air Force.**

* Duckworth. 21s.

or a long period during the war, Wing Commander Lee was head of the erman section in the Directorate of Operational Intelligence at the Air inistry and his book is written with the passionless sincerity of the trained ntelligence officer. It is a fascinating story which he has to tell, a story of ear-success turning into hopeless failure for reasons over some of the most nportant of which the *Luftwaffe* had no control. He has told it well. Most nportant of all, he has made his very readable account of the German Air orce's official life available to students of military history in time for the essons to be of practical value to those who must plan the post-war air forces f the nations.

What, then, are the causes of the failure of the *Luftwaffe* to prevent the efeat of Hitler's Germany, for that air power could have staved off defeat nd pointed the way to victory, there is no room for question? My reading of s history leads me to two conclusions.

First, that the *Luftwaffe,* specifically designed for a short term rôle—the upport of the German armies in a series of short, sharp attacks, which were o give Germany control of Europe—was never able to re-orientate itself to the ong war of attrition which circumstances forced upon it.

Secondly, and as a result of the first cause, that the megalomaniac ambition f Hitler forced upon it a task greater than any air force in the world could ave sustained, to fight on three fronts against constantly mounting opposition, rom a base almost continuously subjected to savage assault, directed with articular emphasis upon its own sources of supply of aircraft and fuel.

When the *Luftwaffe* entered the European war in 1939, it possessed, in ddition to its greater strength, another advantage over the air forces to which t was opposed. During the previous three years, selected units had been gathering operational experience in the Spanish Civil War. In this laboratory, nost of its operational types had been thoroughly tried out in combat and many f its commanders and pilots had had practical experience of operating aircraft n the field.

Its first operations in Poland, against a gallant but ill-prepared foe, served o confirm the truth of the lessons learned in Spain and to foster its belief in ts invincibility. Its performance in the series of *blitzkrieg* operations which carried it through Denmark to Norway and, via Holland and Belgium, into France, threw into relief its fitness to fill with success its allotted rôle of smoothing the forward path of the German armies, though it failed to stop the evacuation of the British army from Dunkirk, in face of the opposition of the Hurricanes and Spitfires of the Royal Air Force.

It was the Battle of Britain which first revealed the essential weakness of the *Luftwaffe* as a balanced air force, based upon an industry capable of maintaining it in all conditions of warfare. Faced with the losses imposed upon it by the British Fighter Command, the *Luftwaffe*, designed for quick victories, with the greater part of its goods in the shop-window, found itself hard put to it to

repair its losses and had to call off the battle.

Thereafter, again and again, we come across the picture of a *Luftwaffe* starved in one theatre to bolster up another; then, by a tremendous effort, restoring its first line strength, at the price of even the most modest backing behind it. There was often even apparent expansion, by the simple expedient of renaming squadrons with higher numbers. A corollary to this stringency was the inability of the aircraft industry to produce in any significant quantity the new types of aircraft of which the need was clearly indicated, from time to time, by developments in the type of operations it was called upon to perform. The industrial economy of the *Reich* was hardly ever able, after 1940, to scrap a proved aircraft and begin production of another on a major scale, with the result that, throughout the war, the old types which figured in the 1939 *Luftwaffe* turn up again and again in amended versions and new rôles. Udet's preference for the comparatively light, twin-engined bomber, deprived Germany, throughout the war, of the heavy four-engined bomber which, in British hands, spelt such havoc to the Fatherland and would have made the ordeal of this country so much harder to bear, had it been operated against us in numbers in 1941, when Germany already possessed in the relatively efficient Condor 200 a prototype from which an adequate four-engined bomber could have evolved. At the very end of the war, had the Germans been able to operate in abundance the jet-fighters in which they were well ahead of us, the *Luftwaffe* might have been able to achieve a last hour come-back which would have seriously prolonged the Allied task.

In the light of present knowledge, then, the German Air Force's defeat in the Battle of Britain was the writing on the wall which foretold Germany's ultimate collapse. The victory won through the devotion of the British Fighter Command in 1940 meant more than the preservation of these islands from invasion, though, had they fallen, the whole fabric of opposition to German dominance would have fallen with them. But, given the survival of Britain, the end was certain, though we should be hardly tried before it was achieved. One wonders if there were those in Germany who read the signs aright on the day when they decided to call off the *Luftwaffe* from the attack; if such there were, Hitler himself was certainly not among them. Nor, as Wing Commander Lee remarks, though the German Air Force had had its first taste of defeat, did the taste stay long in their mouths.

By the beginning of 1941, they were off on another Valkyrie ride, this time to make their *Fuehrer* master of the Mediterranean and all the surrounding lands. During the spring and summer of that year, they played a vital part in German successes. But, with Hitler's invasion of Russia in June, they began upon that period of attempting to be strong upon three fronts at once, which lasted until their final collapse, with the attempt becoming more and more unsuccessful with every month that passed. Thereafter, the *Luftwaffe* effort in the Mediterranean died gradually away into fitful efforts to assist the Army

n its losing fight against the ever growing Anglo-American effort and occa-ional attempts to damage the convoys which were bringing supplies or rein-orcements.

For the Russian campaign, Goering concentrated fully two-thirds of his Air 'orce in its traditional rôle of support of the land forces in what was clearly ntended to be another rapidly successful *blitzkrieg*. But the conditions in vhich it was called upon to fight were very diffierent from those in which it ad gained its successes in the West. Instead of the fifteen aircraft per mile ront which it had been able to mount in its earlier campaigns, it was ow strung out with only two aircraft per mile on a front of more than fteen hundred miles. Not only were the odds against it in the air nuch heavier, even allowing for the inferior quality of the Russian ircraft types at the outset of the campaign, but the problems of supply and naintenance became so complex as to tax even the organizing ability of the German logistical services. That they were able to cope with these problems n winter conditions in Russia through two years of war, disposes of the much ublicised gibe against German rigidity and inability to improvise.

From now until the end, the *Luftwaffe* was committed to its three-front war nd its story becomes one continuous tale of rapid compromise, of switching rom one expedient to another in face of mounting dangers, until the whole difice collapses under blows too heavy to withstand.

Already, by the summer of 1941, Germany was faced with a serious problem n the defence of the Homeland. The British Bomber Command offensive gainst the *Reich* was already beginning to assume proportions which demanded heavy subtraction of fighters from the battle-fronts for purely defensive pur-oses. The mounting scale of attack by night, calling for the formation of nore and more night-fighter squadrons, was complicated in 1942 by the begin-ning of the daylight attacks of the American 8th Air Force, with the consequent liversion of day-fighter squadrons to home defence.

By 1943, the main concern of the *Luftwaffe* chiefs had become the air defence of Germany and the rôle of the air force had changed full circle from that of offensive action in support of an army advancing victoriously from success to success, to one of defensive fighting to protect the communications and industry of the home country against hordes of heavily-armed bombers which aimed heir worst blows against the sources of power on which the life of the *Luftwaffe* depended. The provision of even a minimum of support and pro-ection for the troops on the ground now became a secondary consideration and he production of aircraft centred preponderantly on defensive fighter types. Training within a perimeter in which every flying school was pin-pointed and periodically attacked, became a hazardous performance and was largely re-stricted to the production of fighter pilots, who were fed into operational units at a dangerously early period and were, in any event, of inferior quality by earlier standards and in comparison with the flying crews which the Allies

could call upon in abundance from their infinitely greater resources.

The production of long-range secret weapons to take the place of bombers was embarked upon in an attempt to keep up a semblence of offensive action and for propaganda purposes, though it must have been evident to those in a position to judge that they could have no effect upon the issue of the conflict. It is questionable whether the considerable diversion of manpower and material to the manufacture of the V weapons was justified, though, on the other hand, much Allied bombing effort was expended on the launching sites and was therefore not available against more lucrative targets.

The invasion of France in June 1944, found the *Luftwaffe* in no condition to influence the event one way or the other. Though, for a period, the daylight defences of the *Reich* were denuded of fighter aircraft, the force available to oppose the Allies was negligible in comparison with the massive armada which the British and American Air Forces put into the air. In bombers, the German force available was puny and the huge convoys of Allied vessels lying within easy reach provoked but the feeblest of responses. Even the temptation of the Dakotas dropping parachutists and the long lines of glider tows in the airborne operation for the capture of the crossings of the Maas were hardly interfered with by the German fighters, whose futile efforts to break through the Allied fighter wall had taken the heart out of them. Such losses as there were, came almost entirely from the anti-aircraft guns.

As an offensive weapon, the *Luftwaffe* had shot its bolt, but in defence of the homeland, it could still show fight and, in the late summer of 1944, it looked as though the jet and rocket-propelled fighters might enable it to stage a come-back against Allied bombers. That it failed to do so is attributable to the small numbers in which the new fighters were available, to the inexperience and lack of training of the pilots and to the overwhelming strength of the Allied forces which by now nothing could deflect.

And so, the twilight faded into darkness and the end came for the *Luftwaffe* and for Germany. Hitler's Third *Reich* had lasted little more than a decade and this, too, was officially the life-span of the air arm which he created, though it had been incubated for fully another ten years before it saw the light of day as a military force.

It is now the duty of the Control Commission to see that every vestige of it is destroyed and that Germany is denied access to the upper air. For, this time, we have learned the lesson that, in aviation, the possession of a commercial aviation industry is more than half way to the creation of a military air force. It is not without significance that the Junkers 52, built as a civil transport aircraft, proved itself in war to be one of the most versatile military aeroplanes, as bomber, transport, glider-tower and parachute-dropper.

Whether it will be permanently possible to keep Germany from possessing aircraft is a difficult question. In a world in which air transport will play a progressively more important and normal part, it is not easy to see how a

nation, which it is in all our interests to make once more self-supporting, can be denied the use of the air. It may be that, when the time comes for a decision, the art of war will have entered upon a new phase in which the military aircraft as we know it will be as obsolete as Nelson's *Victory* would be in a modern fleet.

Have we seen the last appearance in war of air forces as we have known them during the two wars in which they have played a part? Are fighters and bombers to become merely museum exhibits? Are civil transport aircraft, even when jet propelled, to disappear from the sky, to give place to giant rockets, which will cross the Atlantic in forty minutes? Will atomic rockets, despatched without the formality of a declaration of war, gain rapid decisions in the wars of the future? What can be said with certainty is that we have in our hands at this moment sufficient scientific knowledge to change fundamentally all our previously held ideas about transportation and to make war so devastating that another world conflict could end only in the elimination of civilization from the world.

How near the German Air Force came to imposing the will of a megalomaniac on the world, Wing Commander Lee has told us in his book. Let us take to heart the moral which General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces during the war and now Head of the Army Air Forces, points in his Foreword:

> Soldiers, sailors and airmen have to fight the wars, but it is the people, the civilian people of all nations, who have to provide the armed forces. It is the people who have to equip and support them. It is the people who mourn the casualties. It is the people themselves who have to sustain, perhaps even more than soldiers, the actual bomb blows of the future now that air power has irrevocably altered not only the nature of war but the potentiality for existence of every person on this earth.
>
> It is the civilian people who must decide and then make the effort to assure that air power is henceforward to become the servant of man and not the scourge it became in the hands of the German Air Force.

(*Air Marshal Douglas Colyer, C.B., D.F.C., has been an Instructor at the R.A.F. Staff College, an Attaché in Paris, Director and later Director General of Personal Services at the Air Ministry, A.O.C. No.* 15 (*Coastal*) *Group, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff* (*Policy*) *and Head of the R.A.F. Delegation in Washington.*)

PHYSICAL PLANNING

By R. H. Wright

IN a statutory sense, physical planning is a new-comer. It arrived so recently as 1909 as a junior partner with the subject of housing; it was limited to planning in towns, and even so to " land which is in course of development or appears likely to be used for building purposes." It was not until 1932 that the scope was widened so as to justify the title of " town and country planning," and the power to prepare a scheme was given to all urban and rural authorities. There was power of combination, and county councils could be invited to take part in a joint committee. There was also a power given to the Minister of Health (who was then in charge centrally) to enforce combination of authorities, but generally speaking executive powers remained in the hands of the urban and rural authorities, and planning, such as it was, went on area by area.

It was, however, in the light of post-war ideas, a negative sort of operation designed on the assumption that all land was likely to be subject to development, by which was understood building development, and that the function of the statutory powers was to control development in the interest of " protecting existing amenities." As this state of affairs overlooked the need for the agricultural use of suitable land, the result was the preparation of a rash of zoning proposals directed to the end of building development, properly safeguarded in point of density, space about buildings, and other " protection of amenities." It has been calculated* that by 1937 the amount of land which had been zoned for housing in schemes that had reached an advanced stage of preparation (considerably less than half of the schemes which were actually being prepared) was large enough to accommodate a population of nearly 300,000,000 additional people.

The war has brought about many radical changes of ideas, and if planning has taken on a new aspect, and the newspaper reader begun to be interested in a subject once considered abstruse, it is because of the general review of social affairs occasioned by the war and in particular of the enforced interest in planning or redevelopment necessitated by the destruction caused by enemy action. And speaking broadly, the word " redevelopment " gives the key to the statutory changes of the post-war era. The limitation of planning to a negative control has taken a turn, especially by reason of the powers given by Parliament in 1944 under which it seems the process will be for the local authority to

* Report of the Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas (1942), page 41.

purchase for redevelopment large areas whether by reason of extensive war damage or of bad lay-out and obsolete development, retaining the freehold and granting leases up to ninety-nine years' duration to facilitate development by private enterprise, where possible. Side by side with this significant change has come a greater concentration of authority in the interests of some uniformity or determination of principle in planning administration. The Minister of Town and Country Planning had only to give a reminder of his 1932 powers of compulsion and large combinations of planning authorities began to appear all over the country, or on the other hand powers were handed over by local authorities to the county councils Without doubt, the results have been good and new efforts are being put forth to frame plans for wide areas, free from the former almost insurmountable obstacles in the way of co-operation between one local authority and another.

There remains the old bogey of compensation, which has dogged the efforts of planning authorities all along and has deterred them time after time from imposing a zoning or carrying out a proposal which has appeared to be in the interests of their constituents. As the Uthwatt Committee* pointed out, in dealing with "floating value":

> Potential development value is by nature speculative. The hoped-for building may take place on the particular piece of land in question, or it may take place elsewhere; it may come within five years, or it may be twenty-five years or more before the turn of the particular piece of land to be built upon arrives. The present value at any time of the potential value of a piece of land is obtained by estimating whether and when development is likely to take place, including an estimate of the risk that other competing land may secure prior turn. If we assume a town gradually spreading outwards, where the fringe land on the north, south, east and west is all equally available for development, each of the owners of such fringe land to the north, south, east and west will claim equally that the next development will "settle" on his land. Yet the average annual rate of development demand of past years may show that the quantum of demand is only enough to absorb the area of one side within such a period of the future as commands a present value.

Bearing in mind the excessive zoning of land for building development, previously referred to, it is easy to appreciate the spurious enhancement of land values and the formidable nature of the potential claims for compensation which faced the local authorities in the execution of their powers; and the concentration of function which has recently gone on is no answer to this. Though planning functions have been handed over, liability for compensation remains largely where it was, and the introduction of new measures into Parliament to deal with the compensation problem, deferred from the last session but promised for this, can lead to the removal of this haunting fear in the way of the active exercise of development powers. It has to be remembered that fundamentally the owner of land is entitled to deal with it as he thinks fit. The development of the byelaw system in the middle of last century imposed one

* Final Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (1942), page 14.

check, and the coming of planning legislation brought another, but subject to the checks the principle remains, and within limits any interference with it attracts compensation, deterrent perhaps more for its uncertainty than otherwise.

In speaking in the opening words of this article of the newness of planning, care is taken to limit that statement to a statutory sense. It is as long ago as 1898 that that surprising man, Ebenezer Howard, a clerk and shorthand writer by avocation and a planner only by hobby, devised or developed the idea of the garden city in order on the basis of the communal ownership of the freehold to provide for the limitation of towns to a manageable size, for the control of their development along acceptable lines, and for a healthy association of town and country on lines of mutual respect. His ideas were copied, though with some departure from principle, throughout the world, though strangely enough they ran close to being forgotten in his own country, until with the post-war revival of interest in planning they were re-issued, in revised version, in the New Towns Act of 1946.

The central theme is the setting up of new communities, with populations whose desirable numbers are suggested at the figure of 60,000 or thereabouts, and with a proper balance of houses, shops, industry and other requirements to cope with such numbers, in order to provide an outlet for the gross overcrowding of our big cities. (One may note in passing that while the Howard scheme involved the purchase of freehold for both the town site and the agricultural belt around it, it was decided by Parliament that only the town site need be acquired under the new Act and the surrounding territory could be protected from undesirable development by the ordinary processes of planning legislation). It is in line with the principles of the new Act that the Minister has rebutted the claims of the big cities to " over-spill " their surplus populations in new towns of their own creation: the new communities must be properly mixed in point of classes and income-levels; the powers of the Board of Trade must be called in aid to settle industry of the right type and extent and above all the new community must be free to work out its own destiny, free, autonomous and responsible.

In this context, it is a matter of some perplexity that the Local Government Boundary Commission finds itself assailed with applications from the large towns to be made larger, spilling over into the countryside, presumably on the ground that they are supplying the necessary social services, or that only they are in a position to do so. It may very well be that the powers of the Commission (a compact of principles established before the war and some of them very old) are not extensive enough to have regard to new planning thought, and one is struck by the apparent contradiction between the activities of the Commission and the testimony of powerful ministerial voices which occasionally break silence on the subject of local government reform . The smaller authorities continue to lose their functions, police, fire

rigade, hospitals, health services, ambulances, education, transport, electricity, as, with rumours of the flight of others, all in spite of the insistence on easy ontact between representative and constituent and the importance of ocal responsibility. There is room for the rumoured project of egional authorities, but not combined with emasculated local authorities; and n any case if, as stated, county boroughs are an obstacle to local government eform, how is the Commission on its present powers to deal with the extension proposals before it, and how will they fit in with regional areas, not to speak f modern town planning principles?

In this welter of conflicting ideas, one turns with pleasure to a study of the omparatively simple and insulated problems of Worcester as depicted in the ook *County Town*.* Worcester is in the happy position of being the unhallenged provider of services for a large surrounding area of southern Worestershire and a strip of adjoining Herefordshire, defined in the book as its ' area of influence ". To that extent the authors of the survey have had a traightforward task before them and the city, on the other hand, can congratulate itself on being able to draw on the services of a gifted team of investigators, led by Professor Florence, from the Faculty of Commerce and Social Science of the University of Birmingham. The final chapter of the book gives some suggestions for redevelopment of the city, carefully screened as being not official, but the great part of its pages are devoted to an extensive survey of the facts and activities of life in Worcester.

It is an outstanding example of preparation before planning, and there is much wisdom in the advice that " survey should be a continuing process in the life of a community, a stocktaking of resources and conditions that allows the citizen to have a comprehensive understanding of the life and activity in which he participates. After this stocktaking should come revaluation of current practices and conditions in the light of new techniques, material, and cultural standards. And from this revaluation should result the physical plan for redevelopment."

The authors begin by seeking to determine Worcester's " area of influence "; describe the physical conditions of the area of survey, and analyse the population trends, the city's industrial structure, local and complementary transport, linkage with the countryside, the housing problem, the provision of health services, public utilities and amenities, shopping provision and needs; requirements for the development of education, and in preparation for the final proposals the present zoning and social grouping. The book gives an indication of the immense amount of research which must needs be undertaken all over the country to compass the proper planning of town and countryside and the location and development of new towns. Not only so, but dealing with the attraction of new industries and acknowledging the call of national require-

* A Civic Survey for the planning of Worcester by Janet Glaisyer, T. Brennan, W. Ritchie and P. Sargant Florence. John Murray. 21s.

ments, it makes clear the necessity for a master plan.

How otherwise can sound decisions be taken on the proper use of the strictly limited acreage of this island, and the distribution of its industrial power? We look to over-all planning to prepare the way for the vital rôle which, as everyone now realizes, agriculture must play in the national economy, to carry electricity and other amenities into the countryside in an endeavour to arrest its depopulation, to preserve to agriculture the best soils, to site and delimit the proposed national parks, to give us a system of motor roads, to make the most economic use of our coal reserves, to arrange the best strategic and economic dispersal of factories and, let it be said, to make proper provision, and no more, for army training areas. The idea of a master plan has once been rejected, but it is quite surely on the way.

(*Mr. R. H. Wright is Town Clerk of Surbiton.*)

SCHOOL MEDICAL SERVICE

By George de Swiet

THE first Elementary Education Act while introducing compulsory teaching in 1870 was framed without due regard to the health problems of school children, and the state of complete indifference in this respect, amounting to neglect, on the part of the authorities continued until 1899, when the passing of the Board of Education Act granted at least permissive powers to deal with defective and epileptic children. This initial stirring of public conscience, though limited in its extent, was the first shy step on the road of progress which was destined to be slow, for the next move did not follow for almost a generation. It was not until the Acts of 1914 and 1918 that we saw vague powers converted into stern duty on the part of the appropriate authorities to provide special schools for the above mentioned types of pupils. It is true that in 1906 provision of meals was enacted along with systematic medical inspection of all children, and a medical department as well as clinics were established. But only in 1944 did the Education Act put a duty on all local authorities to provide, or to secure, all forms of medical treatment—except domiciliary medical service and the care of infectious diseases including tuberculosis.

Furthermore, treatment towards which heretofore parents were obliged to contribute financially has—under this most outstanding recent enactment—become entirely free. It is now necessary for all school nurses also to possess such qualifications as are required from health visitors, since it is their duty to visit the homes of school children. It is obvious that all this has immensely widened the scope of the service and increased the responsibility of the authorities. The 1944 Act lays down that routine medical inspections of children are to take place at specified times only slightly differing from the former practice: after entry, in the last year of primary school (ten plus) and in the last year of school (thirteen plus) and at such other times as may be determined by the Minister or the Authority with the Minister's approval. Besides these specified times, special references by teachers, parents or school nurses and re-examinations are to be made. Moreover, as from April 1, 1945, every local education authority acquired the power to examine medically every child from the age of two onwards.

It is noteworthy that while medical inspection is now compulsory—treatment (however desirable) can be declined by parents, which right, it is hoped, will be but rarely exercised. As if in order to counteract this optional therapy

clause becoming a retrograde step, the authorities are given great latitude to develop medical treatment schemes in the following: orthopaedic work, child guidance, treatment of speech defects by specially trained therapists, miscellaneous clinics for rheumatic children, nutritional defects, orthoptic therapy for squint and various paediatric clinics. Thus under the 1944 Act each authority is compelled to provide, or to secure, fully comprehensive arrangements for medical treatment of children who attend the county schools. Yet it is quite obvious that this expansion will, for several reasons, have to proceed hand in hand with the development of the much bigger plan—the National Health Service under the Ministry of Health. It is of more than symbolical import that the office of Chief Medical Officer of both these ministries is vested in one and the same man and that the Chief County Medical Officers are also Chief School Medical Officers.

The new Act introduced some new terminology and classification. Expressions, like "mentally" or "physically defective", which were in common use for many years have disappeared from official circulation in favour of the new terms: "educationally sub-normal" or "handicapped". Along with this nation-wide desire for changes in nomenclature we witness a more careful sub-division of these "handicapped children" into various categories, while at the same time greater elasticity is allowed in the organization and the curriculum of ordinary schools so as to allow children with defects to be treated in them, such as the "partially sighted", "partially deaf", "maladjusted", etc. There are, of course, special arrangements for the blind, the deaf, the diabetic, the epileptic and those with speech defects. But segregation proceeds even further, and it recognizes the delicate and the hungry child, the ill-housed and ill-clad child and provision can and must be made by the authorities for children who need board and lodging and even clothing, if necessary.

Small wonder that the 1944 Act was universally acclaimed as a great measure by people of all political parties, and, indeed, nothing less than a great measure would suffice in this case. The hugeness of the task performed, for instance, by nurses alone can be inferred from these figures: as the result of fourteen million examinations for verminous condition 500,000 children were found infested. After this few would deny that nurses get to know the social background of the pupils better than anyone else, except the family doctor who has the unique knowledge of the family history besides. School children represent a seventh part of the whole population. In October 1945 there were roughly five million children in primary and secondary schools, while at the same time there were only 724 school medical officers. It appears certain, therefore, that the family practitioner must be included and consulted more and more in the future, as the requirements of the new Education Act are implemented.

Yet the implementation is encountering now considerable difficulties owing

o shortage of staff and equipment. There is also insufficient accommodation n special schools, particularly for the "educationally sub-normal" cases. Recent statistics showed that out of 23,000 residential cases only 3,000 sub-normal ones found a place in special schools. Unless such shortages are speedily overcome much of the effect of the power granted to us will be lost. But progress can only be retarded by the continuing lack of international harmony on the one hand and economic unrest on the other.

Yet it was a great wonder to many observers that the health of the school child did not suffer more than it did through the upheavals of the last war. One is inclined to believe that the evacuation and consequent temporary severance of old family ties had often a beneficial effect on the physical and mental development of the young. Meanwhile those children who were undergoing prolonged treatment in hospitals under the emergency medical service, for one reason or another, often had teaching brought to them in the wards so that their education did not suffer unduly.

While there is a serious lack of buildings, of doctors, dentists and nurses it is gratifying to note that there is no lack of public funds. These seem to be amply available as compared with men and materials. The London local education authority is well able to spend many millions a year and is freely voting considerable sums of money on projects intended to enrich the lives of school children and to ensure their well-being. Also, frequent and generous increments are granted to the staffs. And, since it is customary to draw comparisons with our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic, it can only be flattering to us to hear that the medical service for the child of school age is the weakest link in the chain of public health practice in the U.S.A.

Assuming that the necessary requisites will be gradually coming in, what of the guiding principles on which to build up a modern school medical service? One of them must surely be the belief that the best results will be attained when inspection and treatment are carried out with the fullest co-operation of the child-patient; while enlisting the pupil's intelligent collaboration has, of course, also immense educational values. Of great help in these matters may be found the thesis that all children are very much like ourselves, only more so, in every way—except that they are handicapped in respect of their height, their strength and their general experience of life, quite apart from the other specific handicaps dealt with before. This conception of a "handicap" rather than "defect" or "inferiority" would greatly assist in arriving at a better understanding of child psychology both of the normal as well as of the abnormal types. And, if constantly kept in mind, it would bridge the gulf between them and us by making the relations easier, more natural and confidential. It would develop in the young a sense of dignity instead of one of humiliation. One may, for instance, find it practicable to admit them to a mutual control system designed to check up on those instances where we have failed to practise ourselves what we preached to them. And who could tell

whether these (admittedly not infrequent occurrences) have not well-nigh ruined many a child's character?

I had occasion—in a small way—to test this theory recently on a large gathering of healthy young children whom I was asked to address at a council school on Empire Day. My listeners, who belonged to all ages from seven to eleven, were visibly impressed by the unconventional approach and the unexpected invitation to participate in the great work of personal hygiene on equal terms with parents, teachers and doctors. I encouraged them not only to remember that it is in their interests to carry out all the instructions which they must have heard ever so often regarding ventilation, fresh air and exercise, dental care and the right choice of dietary, but that they should also remind their immediate contacts of the necessity to do likewise. The genuine interest and sense of gratitude this awakened in the young minds could be observed in the children's faces. They seemed to say: Well, here is someone who speaks to us differently, more as equals and not as half-wits, for which we are truly thankful.

Many physicians and surgeons, too, will have to step off the lofty pedestals from which they talk down to the grown-ups. Because the same reasons for a change of front obtain here as well. The co-operation on the part of the patient, be it old or young, on which so much of the success in treatment depends, is itself dependent on the amount of understanding, that is of that intelligent kind of interest which, if properly enlisted, is of a lasting value both to the individuals and to the community. Yet the old theory, that of keeping the patient in ignorance, died very hard and, in fact, is not quite dead in some parts to-day, notably in hospitals, and especially with reference to children. Much of this is, no doubt, due to the time factor, time being in short supply in these places. Hence an additional ground for reducing the number of patients per doctor, thus enabling the medical advisers to spend a little more time and energy on explaining as many aspects of the case as possible to its owner.

What holds good with grown-ups does so even more with children who learn and observe things so much faster. Older children ought to be allowed to participate in the treatment of younger children, applying dressings, administering medicines, preparing special dishes. It is surprising how many of them suddenly betray an inborn talent in this respect which, if stimulated, may lead to nursing or even doctoring later on. An inclination may become a profession when spotted early and dealt with sympathetically. In these days of a grave shortage of nurses the love of looking after the sick will, of necessity, have to be inculcated very early into our girls and kept alive by new methods. The idea recently mooted in connection with child welfare, namely the employment of girls in the later 'teens as child-minders or sitters-in while the parents leave their babies in the care of these young adepts in mother-craft, cannot but be regarded as a move in the right direction. For, from

ooking after healthy infants to nursing sick ones there is but one step, which, f made attractive, may lead us—the Local Health Authorities—out of the dilemma we are in concerning the unprecedented shortage of nurses, midwives, nospital domestic staffs and so on.

Seeing how rapid is now the growth of various lines of treatment which attack familiar though until recent years insufficiently cared for abnormalities, and what vast staffs will soon be required in order to carry out some of the modern methods which demand prolonged and individual attention to each single case (and how much more so in children than in adults!), it would appear rather doubtful whether the complexity of the school medical service will allow it to remain in the hands of the Ministry of Education for very long. Voices are being raised already in favour of an entirely new government department charged with the sole duty of child welfare. This may be largely under the impact of a few newly-uncovered instances of revolting neglect and cruelty. But even when public indignation has subsided there could be a strong case made for a transfer of this health service where it properly belongs, to the Ministry of Health, to which all remaining medical services should be handed over. Such a proceeding will become irresistible as and when the housing side of this dual ministry undergoes devolution.

The principle of integration of which so much has been heard of late whenever the work of doctors is mentioned is unfortunately still offended against by more than one State department, inasmuch as they all adhere strenuously to another more potent principle: what we have—we hold! Half a dozen of them have medical sections and they mean to keep them in the face of the new Health Act and its maker. Meanwhile, what medical practitioners have for years been asking for in vain is a continuity of medical records without which there can be no continuity of treatment. Should they want to piece a case together which presents some diagnostic difficulty, there ought to be a full dossier automatically following each individual whether he be a hopeless chronic invalid or a perfectly sound person, or only appeared to be so. The resulting simplification would benefit doctor and patient alike.

I know of at least one medical practice in which patients are issued with cards containing some essential particulars of their medical history and treatment which enables them, if they should require attention away from home, to obtain it without any loss of time from any hospital or private doctor on production of the card.

Would it be too much to ask that each child on leaving his or her school should be supplied with a brief record of physical ailments and psychological make-up as noted during school years? This would become a valuable introduction to such subsequent medical records as the (now insurance and later State) practitioner is or will be required to keep. Particularly if, as the new Act implies, the latter is encouraged to continue his studies and

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even, if so inclined, to specialize in some branch of medicine. Here again his fancy may take him along either a well-trodden path of recognized specialities or he may choose to develop something new. Under the new Acts, both the Education one of 1944 and the National Health Service one of 1946, more practitioners will handle children of school age in larger numbers than ever before.

To show the speed with which expansion is taking place in this field of our activities it would be enough to point to the latest developments in the care and treatment of the so-called cerebral palsy or spastic cases resulting from head injuries at birth, of whom there are thousands in this country, but who until recently did not receive anything like the attention they are getting now, when special registers of them are being prepared in various big cities, specialists are being trained in the new method of re-education (largely brought over from America) and a new special council has been called to life to organize the campaign under the leadership of eminent members of the profession. And the result of all this much overdue fuss will be that many unfortunate cripples, often quite wrongly dismissed as idiots, who from time to time appear in the street and attract attention with their peculiarly disorderly gait and grimaces, will at last be recognized as amenable to correction and endowed with surprisingly sharp intelligence. But, of course, the earlier the treatment—the better the results.

Equally fruitful could be our labours in the vineyard of child guidance (where amazing effects are often achieved) if we were allowed to see defective characters, faulty behaviour, etc. before the end of the fourth year of age, for that is the best time for their re-making. One can speak here of "cures-while-you-wait" which have to be witnessed to be believed. But the treatment is exhausting to the one who gives it; hence only a few cases can be dealt with in a day by one person who must of necessity spend himself (or herself) the more, the bigger the result. However, looking at it from the sociological point of view, no work could be called greater.

And, finally, there is opening before us a vast new field, as yet but meagrely investigated, of psychogenic factors and their rôle in the causation of diseases as well as in their treatment, which is no less significant in children than it is in adults. One is forced to believe that in studying this subject we have yet to travel some distance before we can feel contented with our knowledge and with the practical results of the art of medicine, but especially when dealing with children of school age on whom the future of humanity so largely depends.

(Dr. de Swiet is a former Chairman of the Maternity and Child Welfare Committee of Paddington Borough Council and Vice-Chairman of the Hospital Management and Development Sub-Committee of the London County Council.)

THE CHURCH AND THE PEOPLE

By B. M. G. Reardon

IT would be instructive to attempt a detailed comparison of the state of what is called organized or institutional Christianity as it exists among us at the present, after the catastrophe of two world wars, with what it was at the close of the Edwardian period or a little earlier. Statistics of course would afford us a certain amount of reliable guidance. We should, for example, observe the falling-off in the numbers of the clergy themselves. In 1911 the figure stood at 20,086, to a total population of thirty-four millions; in 1938 it had sunk to 17,139, in a population of 38.4 millions; and to-day it is lower still. This fact alone finds some explanation for the now evident decline in the personal influence which the clergyman, especially in the town parish, is able to exercise. Yet how far statistics supply us with a really accurate picture is open to question. Thus, out of every hundred children born sixty-seven are baptized at Church of England fonts; but who would venture to suggest that the proportion of the population so represented constitutes, in any other than a barely nominal sense, the laity of the Established Church? We get nearer the truth when we discover that out of the same hundred children only nine continue, after Confirmation, as Easter communicants, while those who regularly attend Holy Communion at their parish churches are in fact far fewer than this.* In these matters one is again and again thrown back upon one's own generalized impressions. The present writer feels for his part obliged to accept the more rather than the less pessimistic view of the existing state of things which the available figures may be understood to indicate. A recent estimate computes that no more than from ten to fifteen per cent. of the people have close associations with a Christian church of any denomination; that twenty-five to thirty per cent. attend a place of worship on outstanding occasions, for example, the national 'day of prayer' during the war; and that of the rest forty-five to fifty per cent. are merely indifferent to religion in all its forms, while the remaining ten to twenty per cent. are more or less hostile. Of these figures it is pertinently enquired whether the failure of the Church to attract or its failure to repel is the more alarming feature.

The publication by the Church of England of the Report of its Commission on Evangelism reveals that the ecclesiastical authorities are by no means un-

* The approximate number of confirmed members of the Church of England at the present time is over 7,000,000, the number of Easter communicants for the twelve years 1925-1936 being an almost stationary figure of two and a half millions. See the pamphlet *Confirmation To-day* (1944), issued under the auspices of the Convocations of Canterbury and York, p. 58.

aware of the extent to which the Christian tradition in this country has become enfeebled and that they are gravely perturbed by it.* "There can be no doubt," say the authors, "that there is a wide and deep gulf between the Church and the people . . . . The evidence of chaplains and others in close touch with all three (fighting) Services, and with munition factories, may be accepted as conclusive. They testify with one voice to the fact of a wholesale drift from organized religion."† Whether the various means suggested for the rehabilitation of Christian institutions are likely to be of much effect only time will decide. Many of the proposed methods are already familiar, such as the parochial mission, and are in principle sound and salutary; others, like the use of religious films, are more novel. But that in the years immediately ahead of us there will be anything in the nature of a revival of religion in the old-fashioned sense is, it is to be feared, sufficiently doubtful.

The problem which faces the denominations to-day differs in a number of important respects from that which faced the Victorians. The Victorian age posed a mainly intellectual, even an academic, problem. Darwinism, the *Essays and Reviews* controversy, the case of Bishop Colenso, the agnosticism of Thomas Henry Huxley and Mr. Bradlaugh, were very live issues among the educated—and churchgoing—classes. I will not say that our contemporary difficulty is not also *ultimately* an intellectual one, a problem of theology. But it is raised in a new context and by other facts. What Dr. Karl Mannheim calls "the crisis in valuation"‡ which the circumstances of our age have brought about is the result of an immense social revolution. The Victorians —although this social revolution had been foreseen and indeed was under way long before the turn of the century—were concerned with the task of adjusting, as far as seemed possible, the inherited scheme of Christian belief to the new conceptions of nature and of man and human history to which science in its several branches had given rise. Yet to us the controversies, once so momentous, on Genesis, on verbal inspiration, on eternal punishment, have hardly more current interest (and perhaps less) than, say, Hobbes *versus* Bramhall on free-will. Unbelief nowadays—and its ubiquity, especially among the young, the brochure on the conversion of England does not seek to minimize—arises not, primarily, from the incredibility of creeds: the recent 'return to orthodoxy', of which Mr. C. S. Lewis's admirable popular tracts are no doubt a significant mark, implies that the divorce of reason from tradition is not as complete as a sometimes eccentric 'modernism' has been apt to assume. It springs rather from the divergence of the socio-economic order presupposed by or at any rate coincident with most forms of historical Christianity from that

* *Towards the Conversion of England* (1945), published by the Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3. "The most depressing reports come from large industrial cities, and from that wide and heterogeneous belt of population which sprawls round London and includes about one-sixth of the total inhabitants of England."

‡ *Diagnosis of our Time* (1943), ch. ii.

hich is emerging in the contemporary world. In other words, the familiar mbolism of Christian belief is not felt to be relevant to the condition of man id society which industrialism, the totalitarian state and repeated world war ave all combined to bring about. The determining factor in life, it is felt, not God or Providence, in the shape of some vast superhuman personality, it the prevailing economy. The compulsion of circumstances and events, ie coercive power of current fads and fashions, impose an authority which vokes neither trust nor respect; while for many minds the evidences of man's inhumanity to man in its twentieth century setting have rendered the postulate f a cosmic moral agency quite unintelligible.

It is not surprising therefore that churchmen would fain show that Providnce has a social conscience. This newly awakened, or rather should we say ewly stimulated, motive is illustrated by the movement whose watchword has een 'Liturgy and Society'. C.O.P.E.C., the 1937 Oxford World Conferince of the Churches, Malvern in the war years, may all be said to mark a fresh rientation of enlightened Christian thought. "The social mission of the hurch," we are told, "is (not) confined to the enunciation of vague and nhelpful generalizations. Of such, the world has grown justifiably tired." means, on the other hand, "that human issues ought to be judged by hristians primarily from the standpoint of a Christian doctrine of man and ociety, with a full and realistic recognition of the situation of man at a given me and point in history, and the possibilities open to him there."*

The conditions which the modern believer must take account of have ffected all denominations, although, it may be, Roman Catholicism, as the nost rigidly institutional form of Christianity known to history, reveals ewest signs of disintegration. The gulf which, it is realized, has now widened between the entire body of the Christian denominations and he 'outside', secular world has, one might venture to think, done more even han community of Christian belief and experience to bring home to the hurches the folly of their continued separatism. But it is pertinent, in view f such a document as *Towards the Conversion of England,* to enquire further o what extent the authority and influence of the national church—the ideal f which has ever been that of continuity and comprehensiveness—have veathered the storms of recent years.

Generally speaking the effects of the war upon the religious outlook and abit of the people have been detrimental. I do not say that the conditions f war have necessarily proved a fresh and successful assault upon faith. Or o put it rather differently, the problem of belief, in the Christian meaning of he word, has not become any the greater as a result of new obstacles raised by liscoveries as to either man's nature or the process of his history. It was really o more easy to believe in God, in a universal moral providence and purpose,—

*The Church and the Planning of Britain. The Report of the Social and Industrial Commission f the Church Assembly, 1944, p. 3f.

and it is the *moral* aspect of faith which must continue to make the chief appeal to the modern religious mind—in this year 1947 than in 1939 or even in 1914. What the world wars have demolished, along with so much material wealth, is the secularist dogma of human perfectibility and its accompanying visions of a historical utopia. But the Christian dogma of man has of its very nature left no room for disillusionment at the prospect of renewed demonstrations of human sinfulness. The main traditions of Christendom, Catholic and Protestant, have in more or less degree regarded human institutions, human civilizations, whatever their intrinsic worth and promise, as ultimately 'under judgment of God.' History, on the Christian view, is (in the phrase of a notable contemporary thinker) "an ever-increasing cosmos creating ever-increasing possibilities of chaos."*

But among the practical consequences of the war is a loss of regard for the institutions of that past whence, in our short memory, global wars have come; and those institutions include the churches. Further the more elaborate and authoritarian organization of society, with its unrelaxing pressure upon the individual, has been made on a purely secular and at times anti-humane and mechanical basis. The climate in which the spiritual in man may grow is thus become more rarefied and ever more distant from the habitat of 'common man'.

In many ways the Church of England has felt these repercussions the most severely. It is still the representative English church. A distinguished group of Anglican thinkers has persistently held, in contradistinction to the 'Catholic' theory of the Tractarian movement, that the Church of England is the people of England on their religious side, and that by virtue alone of this especial status can the national church be judged. The ideal is not unworthy. But it is intelligible only on the assumption that the people of England are Christian in some profounder sense than could possibly be urged to-day. Anglo-Catholicism, in spite of its highly questionable 'branch' theory of catholicity, has taken a more frankly sectarian view of what the Church's position actually is. It has, that is to say, always regarded comprehensiveness—though a principle which it has never scrupled to invoke when expedient—as a dubious merit. But the place and function of the national church is not properly to be found in what its rather vocal Anglo-Catholic section alone has had to say about it. The Church of England is probably the broadest body in Christendom, yet it has on that account lacked the cohesion, the binding minority-consciousness, of dissent, whether of the Protestant or the ultramontane kind. It may be argued that narrow credal dogmatism of any sort has been long ago exploded, but it is abundantly clear that the characteristic 'broadness' of Anglicanism has been able to do little to arrest that dissolution of religious sentiment which has now become so obvious and to which no previous century can offer a real parallel. The popular response to the calls for national prayer does not, it is to be feared, prove any-

* Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, p. 108.

thing to the contrary, but suggests rather that the Church of England is sometimes perilously near to being the shrine less of faith in a supernatural order than of the more flourishing spirit of nationalism.

There are, as the figures show, fewer clergy to-day than a generation since. Yet even so the shrinkage in their numbers is not proportionate to the decline in 'practising' church members. The fact has to be recognized—and the sooner the clergy as a body examine and confront its implications the better—that the parish churches both in town and country are very nearly empty. Those who do attend are noticeably not the younger parishioners. We need not suppose that churchgoing is any infallible measure of a people's spirituality or ethical maturity; countless instances might be adduced from Biblical times down to our own of the 'vain oblations' of a merely perfunctory and conventional religious observance; but it is a good general guide. It does suggest that modern man finds that 'religion' in its large organizational or political character has no interpretation to offer him of his own experience of life, and no imperative which he can imaginatively grasp and obey. That his conclusion is justly drawn is not, without drastic qualification, to be allowed. Modern man is not at all the open-eyed innocent, thirsting only for truth and justice, which after the sentimental manner of the day he is too often depicted to be. Nor indeed is the historic theology of the Christian Church, as embodied, for example, in the work of our own Hooker and given liturgical expression in the Book of Common Prayer, so hopelessly out-dated as liberal opinion too readily concludes. But that the Church does not 'get' the people is obvious enough, whatever the reasons. Ironically, this loss of influence—though the Church of England never has, at any time, meant much to the industrial masses—goes hand in hand with a great increase in its organizational activities. Yet another and very significant example is afforded by the precipitous decline of clerical influence in education.

And what of the personal standing of the clergy? They are generally poorer than were their Victorian predecessors; but an enforced poverty has no necessary ascetic value, nor is inability to pay bills a stimulus to the parsons' piety. Their prestige, even in country districts, is almost certainly lower. It would not be true to say that they are unpopular; but it would be no more true to say that their opinions are particularly valued or their example esteemed. The supernatural power of faith is not always discernible in their lives; there is a dogged sense of duty; often a rather motiveless enthusiasm; but—and the laity perceive it—too little imagination or spiritual insight. Their standards, their mode of life, are not obviously different from that of the community in which they find themselves. And their pathos is that they are cognisant of their failure. Nor is it much otherwise in the case of the episcopal bench. The bishops enjoy more eminence than influence. The utterances of a few are freely but not always wisely reported in the public press. That they do not 'lead' the nation in all things spiritual and moral none probably realizes so

well as do they themselves. The great regard paid to the late Archbishop William Temple is only the exception which proverbially proves the rule. The Church has found his loss irreparable.

Is there then no remedy for this nerveless and frustrated condition of things? The Commission on Evangelism believes that there is, and devotes the bulk of its valuable report to constructive proposals. There is however no single answer. The malady is of too complex a nature. The majority of the people will not become Christian in any other than a nominal way until they have gone through the Christian experience, and that experience requires as its conditions feelings of personal moral responsibility and of personal defect, as well as a sense that human life charges us with a problem which is not even bounded, let alone solved, by our concern for material or social needs and such provision as we can make for them. The Christian experience is not of uniform character; it may begin with the individual or it may begin with the group; but in any case by some realization of, in William James's expression, "the wider self through which saving experiences come." At present the wider self is the political community, though the saving experiences are so far mainly proleptic. In other words, Christianity must again become, what it was in the earliest centuries and indeed in all the more vital phases of its history, a medium of salvation. Until that occurs Christian institutions will be

> . . . . no longer wings to fly
> But merely vans to beat the air
> The air which is now thoroughly small and dry.*

All the same the problem has its narrower aspects, and suggests some more immediately practicable lines of solution. Let it be recognized, for example, that the National Church, still by law established, has long since ceased to represent the nation on its religious side. Its national character is largely a formality. And before it can begin anew the task of converting the people of this country it must acknowledge its real position and discard the great anachronism of the State Establishment. We may allow a smile when we think of Disestablishment as Dr. Hensley Henson's King Charles's head. But who, on confronting the realities of the situation, will not endorse his often repeated arguments as largely true?† Those who, like Canon Charles Smyth,‡ maintain that establishment secures to the Church a 'position of vantage' wherefrom to instruct the State as to the implications of the Christian moral outlook surely fail to realize that what else would be a sound enough principle—and in principle establishment is to be admitted—is nullified by the radically trans-

* T. S. Eliot, *Ash Wednesday* (i. 35-37).

† "When we examine closely the present relations of Church and State, we find that they represent a survival from a state of society which has wholly passed away: that the assumptions on which they were shaped, and by which alone they can be defended, have failed: that they are now confessedly anomalous, and must be justified, if justified at all, on grounds of practical advantage: that these grounds are no longer sufficient, if, indeed, they ever were sufficient, to sustain the grave violations of spiritual principle which the Establishment involves." (*Bishoprick Papers*, p. 94).

‡ See *Religion and Politics* (1943).

ormed circumstances in which it must now be applied. The State Establishnent, with the existing mode of patronage, even the parochial system itself, elongs properly to an age and an order which were Christian by virtue of a ommonly accepted belief and code of morals. To-day there is the widest ndifference to Christianity in all its visible forms. But there is little actual pposition, and the fact that most men distinguish, however crudely, between Christianity' in its spiritual and moral essence and the churches with which hey are familiar, is of itself some reassurance that the age has not lost all sense of value and proportion. 'Official' Christianity—such things as the Abbey nd St. Paul's, Convocation, public school religion, military parade services, even certain occasional offices in the Prayer Book—exists as a façade to the ecularism that is now dominant; but it cannot conceal its incapacity to exercise nuch effective power, certainly not the power of a self-sacrificing heroism, pon men's lives. The Church of England must free itself of the old latitudinarian error that its function is only to sanctify the people's natural virtues, nd of the no less misleading doctrine which would attach to the historical Christian organization claims that cannot by any moral test be substantiated. *Ye must be born again.* Christian institutions have a great task in the world which lies before us. But in their present condition they cannot fulfil it. The Church of England, from the nature of its historical destiny, is cast in the mould of an age which has gone by. The ensuing years will show whether it has it n it to recreate a new experience, a new life, and hence a new authority over he minds of men.

FROST

By Alice Harwood

SO cold it is the spirit faints,
Yet beauty's here for him who sees;
The long, wan shaft of sunshine paints
A purple shadow on the trees
Chiselled beneath a sculptor's hand
In purest marble, stately frieze
Posing, a silent statue-band
Remote in time's eternities.

The netting on the tennis-court
Is diamond-latticed white as snow,
Like casements from which ladies sought
The silver knights that passed below,
With eyes upraised and pennons flown,
As vanquishers from battles fought
On scorching sand-dunes crisply blown
More than five hundred years ago.

Pity the swans, their plumage grey
Against the whiteness of the lawn
That fronts the frozen river; they
Are stiff as sentries, more forlorn;
Yet sensing dumbly in a dream
Themselves in spring, their cygnets born,
Afloat like argosies downstream,
Blanched, moonlit freight, from dusk till dawn.

THE POPULARITY OF DETECTIVE FICTION

By G. F. McCleary

IN a B.B.C. radio discussion last July some harsh things were said of detective fiction. It was accused of fostering a sympathetic interest in crime and criminals, and a love of bloodshed for its own sake. One speaker even went so far as to place detective fiction among the influences that had brought about the rise and development of Hitlerism—a movement which, he said, he had studied in Germany and against which he had tried in vain to warn his fellow countrymen.

This surely was a hard saying. One thinks of the blameless Dr. Watson and the great detective he has immortalized, with whom, under the motherly care of Mrs. Hudson, he lived for many years a happy domestic life in her lodgings at 221B Baker Street. One thinks also of the humane methods of Lord Peter Wimsey, Father Brown, Dr. Thorndyke, M. Hercule Poirot, and other famous and high-minded detectives. It is difficult to look upon such popular favourites as factors in the building up of the Hitler régime; but it should be said that the speaker who condemned detective stories admitted that he did not read them.

The speaker on the other side, himself a distinguished writer of detective stories, took high ground in defence of his craft. He claimed, in effect, that detective fiction is an influence making for righteousness; for in it virtue is always triumphant; justice is done; the wrong-doer is invariably found out and punished. He held also that the detective story fulfils one of the main functions of literature—to entertain the reader. Here, however, he was met with an objection from a third speaker, who deplored the tendency of modern readers to prefer books of mere entertainment to the rich intellectual sustenance awaiting them in the works of, for example, Shakespeare, Dickens, Chaucer, and Dante. He did not, we may assume, intend his listeners to infer that entertainment was not to be found in those works; for he surely knew that when it comes to sheer "entertainment value" no specialized writer of detective stories approaches within measurable distance of the creators of Falstaff and Sam Weller. It is curious that none of the speakers reminded the radio audience that Dickens wrote two detective novels: *Bleak House* and *The Mystery of Edwin Drood.*

All the speakers were agreed, however, that, for better or worse, detective fiction is enormously popular. Its practitioners write for a public vast in extent and insatiable in its appetite for their writings.

Detective stories are far from being a product of the twentieth, or the nineteenth, century; they have their origin in the far-away past. In the Apocrypha we are told of the feat of detection by which Daniel convinced King Cyrus that the Babylonian idol, Bel, which the king provided with a huge daily ration of meat and drink, was "but clay within and brass without, and did never eat nor drink anything." One day, after the ration had been set before Bel, Daniel's servants, in the presence of the king alone, strewed ashes throughout the temple, and then went out and sealed the door with the king's signet. In the night, the seventy priests of Bel with their wives and children entered the temple through a secret door and, as part of their daily routine, consumed Bel's ration. The upshot is best told in the majestic language of King James's translators:

> In the morning betime the king arose, and Daniel with him. And the king said, Daniel, are the seals whole? And he said, Yea, O King, they be whole. And as soon as he had opened the door, the king looked upon the table, and cried with a loud voice, Great art thou, O Bel, and with thee is no deceit at all. Then laughed Daniel, and held the king that he should not go in, and said, Behold now the pavement, and mark well whose footsteps are these. And the king said, I see the footsteps of men, women, and children. And then the king was angry. And took the priests with their wives and children, who showed him the privy doors, where they came in, and consumed such things as were on the table. Therefore the king slew them, and delivered Bel into Daniel's power, who destroyed him and his temple.

The technique of detectivism that depends upon drawing inferences from minute observations—the technique with which Sherlock Holmes so often amazed Dr. Watson and solved many problems—is exemplified in Voltaire's romance, *Zadig,* published in 1747. When Zadig was asked by certain officers of the King of Babylon whether he had seen the queen's dog and the king's horse, which had both been lost, he described the animals so accurately, though he said he had never seen them, that he was accused of having stolen them and sentenced to be flogged and banished to Siberia. Hardly had the sentence been pronounced when the animals were found; and though the sentence was annulled, Zadig was fined 400 ounces of gold for having said he had not seen the dog and horse when it seemed obvious to the judges that he must have seen them. Being then permitted to state his case, he explained so conclusively that he had deduced the appearances of the animals from the marks left by them along their route of escape that, although some magi declared he ought to be burnt as a sorcerer, the king remitted the fine and the 400 ounces of gold were returned to him, minus 398 ounces retained as legal expenses. Concluding that it was dangerous to be well informed, Zadig refrained from reporting that an escaped prisoner had passed under his window, for which offence he was fined 500 ounces of gold. After thanking the judges for their leniency, according to the Babylonian custom, he said to himself: "*Grand Dieu! . . . qu'il est difficile d'être heureux dans cette vie!*"

The father of modern detective fiction is Edgar Allen Poe, who in the years

1841-45 published five detective tales in which may be found the sources of much that is characteristic of later detective fiction. In the first of the five, *The Murders in the Rue Morgue,* which appeared in 1841 in *Graham's Magazine,* a Philadelphia monthly then edited by Poe, a standard of detective story telling was set which, according to G. K. Chesterton, "has never been definitely and indisputably surpassed." The detective, Auguste Dupin, is an amateur who holds the detective police in poor esteem. He succeeds where they fail; he notes significant details that escape their scrutiny; and he brings to bear upon the observed facts a power of analysis and deductive reasoning utterly beyond their capacity. His exploits are recorded by a friend who is a fellow occupant of the house in which they live together in Paris, and whose admiration for Dupin knows no bounds. Are not these familiar elements in later detective stories?

In 1852 the craft of detective fiction writing was made glorious by the appearance among its practitioners of the mighty genius of Charles Dickens. In that year *Bleak House* was published, the first of Dickens's books written under the influence of Wilkie Collins, with whom he was closely associated in the later years of his life, and who in 1868 brought out that supreme masterpiece of detective fiction, *The Moonstone.* Inspector Bucket, one of the most popular of detectives, who plays an important part in *Bleak House,* was drawn from a living model, Inspector Field, a member of the detective force established by Scotland Yard in 1842, of whose work Dickens wrote five articles in the early numbers of *Household Words.*

In 1862 the vogue of the detective story was widely extended by Miss Mary Elizabeth Braddon, whose *Lady Audley's Secret,* her second novel, was published in that year and quickly became a best-seller in many languages. In this book, the detective work is done by a briefless barrister, who is moved to attempt the solution of the mystery of his friend's disappearance by his interest in his friend's sister. He begins by compiling a statement of: "The facts connected with the disappearance of George Talboys, inclusive of facts that have no apparent relation to that circumstance." He was so proud of this heading that he began to think he ought to have pursued his profession instead of dawdling his life away as he had done; and it is satisfactory to learn that after he had married Miss Talboys he made a reputation at the bar in the great breach of promise case of Hobbs *versus* Nobbs, "wherein he convulsed the Court by his deliciously comic rendering of the faithless Nobbs's amatory correspondence."

The next outstanding contribution to detective fiction was the work of Emile Gaboriau, who in 1866 achieved international celebrity with *L'Affaire Lerouge,* the first of his long series of highly popular detective novels. In his star detective, Lecoq, Gaboriau created one of the most interesting and famous of sleuths, and brought him into one book after another. Readers of Stevenson's *New Arabian Nights* will remember that the study of Gaboriau

was recommended to the Rev. Simon Rolles by Prince Florizel of Bohemia. Mr. Rolles, not knowing how to dispose of a stolen diamond of immense value, and wishing therefore to instruct himself in life, made bold in his club to address Prince Florizel, of whose identity he was completely ignorant, but whom he judged from his appearance to be pre-eminently a man of the world, and ask whether a knowledge of life could be acquired from books:

> "By life", he added, "I do not mean Thackeray's novels; but the crimes and secret possibilities of our society, and the principles of wise conduct among exceptional events. I am a patient reader; can the thing be learnt in books?"
>
> "You put me in a difficulty," said the stranger. "I confess I have no great notion of the use of books, except to amuse a railway journey . . . . Yet stay", he added, "have you read Gaboriau?"
>
> Mr. Rolles admitted he had never even heard the name.
>
> "You may gather some notions from Gaboriau", resumed the stranger. "He is at least suggestive; and as he is an author much studied by Prince Bismarck, you will, at the worst, lose your time in good society."

In 1876 Gaboriau's countryman, Fortuné Du Boisgobey, whose real name was Castille, leapt into fame with his *Les Mystères du nouveau Paris,* the first of his numerous *romans de policier;* and two years later Miss Anna Katherine Green, of New York, brought out her first novel, *The Leavenworth Case,* which soon achieved world-wide popularity. Many other successful detective novels flowed from Miss Green's prolific pen. She had a large public in this country; and it is said that when the eminent English jurist, Professor A. V. Dicey, visited America in 1898 and was asked what he most wished to see, he replied: "The home of the authoress of *The Leavenworth Case.*"

Thus, in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century the popularity of detective fiction had been firmly established. A vast and highly receptive public awaited men and women who could write good detective stories and publishers who knew a good thing of that kind when they saw it. Famous detectives had been created, whose exploits enthralled the young and old of many countries. But none had achieved the celebrity that makes a man's name a household word and a class name; so that if one says a certain man is not a "Solomon" the meaning of the saying at once becomes apparent. None had said things it would be difficult to quote without immediately revealing their origin. But the stage had been set for the appearance of such a celebrity; and in the fourth quarter of the century he appeared.

He was called into being in the winter of 1885-86 by a young doctor, who was then conducting an unremunerative general medical practice at Southsea, but a few miles away from where Stevenson, at Bournemouth, was writing *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.* The young doctor, whose name was Arthur Conan Doyle, presented his detective in a book entitled *A Study in Scarlet,* which, after being refused by many publishers, was bought outright for £25 on October 30, 1886, and appeared fourteen months later—fourteen months later!—as Beeton's Xmas Annual for 1887. In his book

recorded the first meeting of the detective, whose name is Sherlock Holmes, with Dr. John H. Watson, which took place in the chemical laboratory of the ancient and revered hospital of St. Bartholomew.

There are certain meetings that have been rich in consequence to the human race. Of such is the introduction of James Boswell to Samuel Johnson on May 16, 1763, in the back-parlour of Thomas Davies's book-shop in Russell Street, Covent Garden, where Boswell, then twenty-two years old, had been drinking tea with Davies and his wife. When Johnson entered, Davies introduced Boswell, who, knowing Johnson's strange prejudice against the Scots, entreated Davies not to divulge where he came from. It was in vain. "From Scotland," said Davies. "Mr. Johnson," said Boswell, "I do indeed come from Scotland; but I cannot help it." "That, Sir, I find," retorted the sage, "is what a very great many of your fellow-countrymen cannot help."

The meeting of Watson and Sherlock Holmes was also fraught with blessings to mankind. Boswell and Watson had, indeed, much in common. Both were rapt hero worshippers. Each gave up the best of his life to chronicling the sayings and doings of an extraordinary man; and so made himself immortal. Watson's hero, Sherlock Holmes, is the most popular detective that has ever appeared in fact or fiction. His fame transcends the barriers of language, race, and national frontiers. He enthrals young and old, highbrows and lowbrows, the learned and the illiterate, idle schoolboys and diligent university dons. His lightest sayings—"You know my methods, Watson"—may be cited anywhere in full assurance that their origin will at once be recognized. The lustre of his fame has conferred immortality upon some otherwise undistinguished police officers and numerous criminals and their victims; and also upon his biographer, Dr. John H. Watson, who, however, shines on his own account, having much in him for which we may well be thankful apart from the service he has rendered to mankind in chronicling the exploits of Holmes.

Since the appearance of the great Sherlock, detective stories have multiplied exceedingly, and among their writers are men and women who have achieved distinction in other fields of literature. Some have produced good detective tales; others have been less successful. An eminent essayist, playwright, or writer of what in transatlantic parlance may be called "straight novels" does not necessarily succeed in detective fiction. It is difficult to imagine Sterne producing a good detective story in spite of his enormous command of the pen. Stevenson, however, could have done it. If you are doubtful, you have only to read *The Pavilion on the Links,* which Conan Doyle declared to be "one of the great short stories of the world."

To achieve success in detective fiction, it is not enough to be skilled with the pen; it is necessary also to be master of the technique of the detective story, which is said to be as specialized and difficult as the technique of playwriting. The masters of the technique are few. And no wonder. There is

first the difficulty of thinking up a good plot. It is rumoured that the author of one of the most brilliant of detective novels allowed many years to go by before he published his second contribution to detective fiction, simply because he was long unable to construct a plot that would survive comparison with the high standard set in his first book. Then there are the difficulties of developing the plot; of creating interesting characters; of giving the necessary clues without giving away the mystery; of setting out the facts in a way that never allows the reader's attention to flag, and does not call upon him to bear in mind masses of detail, such as plans showing the arrangement of rooms and so forth. Some stories are so over-loaded with details that only by considerable application can the course of the narrative be followed. And there is the difficulty of presenting an effective upshot. How many promising stories have we not read that petered out in a "most lame and impotent conclusion."

But the vast public that reads detective tales is not very critically minded. One of the most devoted readers of such tales I ever knew was a learned Scotsman with an international reputation as a theologian. He preferred good detective tales to bad, but any tale with a detective in it appealed to him. There is much detective fiction that does not reach a high standard of excellence; and some tales seem to have been written hastily on a sellers' market for what Stevenson called "the dibbs." Not that there is anything deplorable in writing for the dibbs—unless it results in the production of inferior work. Did not Stevenson himself, the most fastidious of artists, confess that he wrote *The Pavilion on the Links* for the dibbs, of which he was then in sore need? In 1879, when in San Francisco, he sent the manuscript to Henley to be "placed", saying:

> It is the dibbs that are wanted . . . . Dibbs and speed are my mottoes. Do acknowledge the *Pavilion* by return . . . . I have no copy except of one or two places where the vein would not run. God prosper it, poor *Pavilion*! May it bring me money for myself and my sick one, who may need it, I do not know how soon.*

It is satisfactory to note, however, that in detective fiction it is, generally, the best work that gets the widest circulation.

The popularity of the detective story is easy to understand. It almost invariably has a happy ending, and, like the crossword puzzle, it offers a problem that calls forth a pleasurable and a not too exacting mental activity. A lazy reader need not make a very determined effort to solve the problem; he may be content to follow the flow of incident and await the detective's solution and his account of the steps by which he reached it. Then, detective fiction deals with events. Most people like stories in which things happen. They do not much care for authors who, as J. M. Barrie put it, devote a volume to a lady's reasons for passing the cruet, and find it hard work to compress into three volumes all they have to say "about a lady and gentleman who agree

* *The Pavilion on the Links* appeared in the *Cornhill Magazine*, then edited by Leslie Stephen, in the second half of 1880, when it was read by the present writer for the first time.

ot to become engaged." Most people are not interested in being told, at ength, what an undistinguished artillery officer thought after an unidentified ady had kissed him by mistake in a Russian country house. They prefer the nethod of O. Henry, who tells us not what his characters think, but what they lo. When Robinson Crusoe sees the print of a naked foot upon the sand it s not so much what he thinks about it that interests us as what he does about t. In detective fiction it is important to know how to deal effectively with ootprints. Much may be done with footprints. For example:

"One false statement was made by Barrymore at the inquest. He said that there were no traces upon the ground round the body. He did not observe any. But I did—some little distance off, but fresh and clear."

"Footprints?"

"Footprints".

"A man's or a woman's?"

Dr. Mortimer looked strangely at us for an instant, and his voice sank almost to a whisper as he answered:

"Mr. Holmes, they were the footprints of a gigantic hound."

Detective fiction shows no sign of waning popularity. On the contrary, its popularity seems tending to increase. It evidently satisfies a need of our modern world—a world not too abundantly supplied with sources of satisfaction. In all sections of the community there are innumerable readers quick to respond to the call of the detective story, which may be summarized in seven words written by the most popular of all writers of detective fiction: "Come, Watson, come! The game is afoot!"

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

COWPER AND FLYING MACHINES

By W. Forbes Gray

COWPER, most domesticated of poets, preferred a secluded life so much that, by his own confession, he " would not change conditions with any saint in Christendom." None the less he found it pleasant to " peep through the loop-holes of retreat," to see " the stir of Babel and not feel the crowd." No reader of Cowper's delightful letters, in which so high a standard of epistolary virtue is maintained, can fail to be impressed with his avid interest in public affairs and the frequent shrewdness of his observations regarding them.

Considering his antecedents, nothing perhaps is more remarkable than the enthusiasm Cowper displayed in what were really the beginnings of aviation. In his correspondence for the years 1783 and 1784 the poet recurs to the subject again and again, the explanation being that during this period the earliest experiments with the flying machine were taking place. In November 1783, Stephen Montgolfier, in company with the Marquis d'Arlandes, made the first aerial voyage across Paris, remaining in the air for twenty-five minutes.

When Cowper heard the news he was elated, and summoned the Rev. William Unwin to rejoice with him. " The balloons prosper," wrote the poet, " I congratulate you upon it. Thanks to Montgolfier, we shall fly at last." And in an epistle to the Rev. John Newton he indulges in a vision of the future.

> " The time, we may suppose, is at hand . . . when these airy excursions will be universal, when judges will fly the circuit, and bishops their visitations ; and when the tour of Europe will be performed with much greater speed, and with equal advantage, by all who travel merely for the sake of having it to say, that they have made it."

Doubtless this was written ironically. Yet the poet prophesied better than he knew.

From 1783, and for some time thereafter, Cowper's letters testify to his absorbing interest in the art of flying as practised with the balloon. " My mind," he informs Newton, " is frequently getting into these balloons, and is busy in multiplying speculations as airy as the regions through which they pass . . The invention of these new vehicles is yet in its infancy, yet already they seem to have attained a degree of perfection which navigation did not reach till ages of experience had matured it. . . . Nothing within the reach of human ingenuity will be left unattempted to accomplish, and add all that is wanting to this last effort of philosophical contrivance."

Besides being strangely prophetic, Cowper exhibited theoretical knowledge of the problems connected with flying that, in the eighteenth century, might well be regarded as astonishing. " Every fowl of the air," he tells Newton, provides a pattern : " Wings and a tail, indeed, were of little use, while the body, so much heavier than the space of air it occupied, was sure to sink by its own weight, and could never be held in equipoise by any implements of the kind which human strength could manage. But now we float; at random, indeed, pretty much, and as the wind drives us; for want of nothing, however, but that steerage which invention . . . may be expected to supply."

While substantially sound as regards the mechanics of flying, Cowper is ludicrously astray in anticipating the consequences likely to accrue if and when man became as familiar with the air as he is with the sea. The poet propounds the question as to whether aviation when full-blown will prove " a mercy or a judgment." Unhesitatingly

e plumps for the latter, supporting his view with the most preposterous of reasons. If a power to convey himself from place to place, like a bird, would have been good or man, his Maker would have formed him with such a capacity," whereas, " he has een a groveller upon the earth for six thousand years, and now at last, when the close f this present state of things approaches, begins to exalt himself above it. So much ie worse for *him*. Like a truant schoolboy, he breaks his bounds, and will have reason o repent of his presumption." Apparently it did not occur to Cowper that there can e no breaking of " bounds " where the inventive faculty is concerned, and that there is othing presumptuous in man making the most of his endowments.

Cowper submits a second reason, even less cogent than the first, why man's conquest f the air will prove a divine judgment. " With the exercise of very little foresight it is asy to prognosticate a thousand evils which the project must necessarily bring after t ; amounting at last to the confusion of all order, the annihilation of all authority, with angers both to property and person, and impunity to the offenders." In fact Cowper s so resolutely opposed to any exploitation of the air that he vows that were he " absolute egislator" he would " make it death for a man to be convicted of flying, the moment ie could be caught." Furthermore, the poet is of opinion that it would be " no murder " to bring the audacious airman " down from his altitudes by a bullet sent hrough his head or his carriage." Cowper is indulging no facetious mood ; he is to ull appearance in dead earnest.

But in Cowper's day, and for long after, aviation had not advanced beyond the balloon, which was hardly even dirigible. In this form of flying machine he took delight, though rather inconsistently, since he feared developments that would lead eventually to " the confusion of all order, the annihilation of all authority," being contrary to the divine purpose. In August 1784, he hears with pleasure that an intimate friend is making a balloon " to fly upon the wings of ignited spirits, and will therefore, I suppose, be sent up at night." Cowper saw its ascent from Emberton Meadow, and records his impressions in an epistle to John Newton. " Thrice it rose, and as often descended . . . In the evening it performed another flight at Newport, where it went up, and came down no more. Like the arrow discharged at the pigeon in the Trojan games, it kindled in the air, and was consumed in a moment."

And while conscious of the risks balloonists ran, Cowper could yet write to Joseph Hill (December 4, 1784) :

> " I envy those happy voyagers, who, with so much ease, ascend to regions unsullied with a cloud, and date their epistles from an extra-mundane situation. No wonder if they outshine us who poke about in the dark below, in the vivacity of their sallies, as much as they soar above us in their excursions. . . . Their vocation is to see fine prospects and to make pithy observations upon the world below."

Cowper's envy of the " happy voyagers " is, however, tempered with discretion. While they soar to heights one trembles to think of, and survey the earth from situations hitherto unknown to mortal man, the poet prefers to remain below, for with him it is a matter of " creeping " rather than of flying, and he wishes to carry with him " an unbroken neck to the grave."

Still there is no flagging of Cowper's interest in aerial navigation. When he learns of the pioneer aeronaut Blanchard, along with Dr. Jeffries, crossing the English Channel from Dover to Calais in circumstances of almost unparalleled danger, he is greedy for particulars of the wonderful exploit. Blanchard's performance took place on January 7, 1785, and a week later the poet is imploring William Unwin to tell him how tragedy was averted. Cowper writes :—" I have been crossing the Channel in a balloon, ever since I read of that achievement by Blanchard. I have an insatiable thirst to know the philosophical reason, why his vehicle had like to have fallen into the sea, when, for aught that appears, the gas was not at all exhausted. Did not the extreme cold condense the inflammable air, and cause the globe to collapse ? Tell me, and be my Apollo for ever ! "

THE PROBLEM OF WAR IN 19th CENTURY ECONOMIC THOUGHT, by Edmund Silberner. *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.* 20*s.*

Dr. Silberner's extensive and interesting survey of the views of nineteenth century economists on war in its relationship to economics brings out two facts: firstly, that the problem of war, was, on the whole, given little systematic attention —probably because in that relatively peaceful period following the Napoleonic wars there was little reason why it should exercise the minds of economists in any particular fashion; secondly, that in so far as they dealt with the problem, most authors, with the exception of the protectionists (among whom the German historical school must be included), believed that the disappearance of war as a social phenomenon was bound to follow from its economic harmfulness and could, with the progress of enlightenment, be expected to occur in the near, or at least in the foreseeable, future. In retrospect, this belief appears childishly ingenuous. These optimists went so far as to dismiss —with the exception of Gustave de Molinari, a Belgian liberal—the necessity of a specific organization for the maintenance of peace. In a different fashion and for different reasons, the Socialists were also optimists in that they believed that the coming of socialism would by itself result in the abolition of war.

The protectionists were pessimists. In keeping with the general logic of their doctrine, they were mostly inclined to stress the inevitability of war; in particular was this the case of the German historical school (Roscher, Knies, Schäffle, Schmoller). It is, indeed, this belief in the inevitability of war which explains in large measure their defence of protectionism. Already in 1841, their forerunner, the German Friedrich List, had written: "War has called into existence the modern systems of protection"—a statement not so surprising from an ardent German nationalist who became the spiritual father of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa,* the forerunner in 1915 of Hitler's *Neue Ordnung.* But List, at least, professed theoretical attachment to the idea of world peace which he believed would result from a world federation possible only when protectionism had removed economic inequality between the industrial have, and the agricultural have-not, countries. As Dr. Silberner shows, this profession has no deep logical connection with his general economic doctrine. It has all the airs of an afterthought conceived *pour dorer la pilule.*

Dr. Silberner, who formerly taught economics at Geneva University and is now in the United States, has produced a valuable book on a subject which, surprisingly, has hardly been surveyed before in systematic fashion. Its extensive bibliography, which includes many little-known publications, is in itself of the highest value. One may hope that the author will, at some future date, extend his survey to the first half of the twentieth century and that he will then examine a problem which the reviewer believes requires re-examination in the light of the full employment experiences of World War II. That is the problem of the economic destructiveness of war. While a precise balance sheet would be difficult to establish, some useful figures are available. They do not necessarily endorse the view predominantly held until lately that the balance sheet is of necessity economically negative, or may at least compel a distinction between a loss on the capital side, and a possible gain on the income side. The purely economic aspect of war is one thing, its social and human aspect another. And from the economic angle, it may not be true, after all, that "war does not pay."

R. P. SCHWARZ.

GERMAN YOUTH: Bond or Free, by Howard Becker. *Kegan Paul.* 18*s.*

Mr. Howard Becker, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wiscon-

sin, has made a useful contribution to The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction by this study of German youth tendencies based in part on his experiences "roaming" with the *Wandervögel* in Germany in 1923, and on wide reading of the literature of that subject backed by further visits in 1934-35. He describes with sufficient sympathy to indicate insight their romantic revolt against conventional standards of society and sets himself to answer the question: how did these rebels—or a great part of them—come in time to be attracted to the banners of the authoritarian Hitler Youth organization?

The author analyses at first the myths that lay at the heart of the *Wandervögel* with many reproductions of the "Pluck-Fiddle Jack" series by way of illustration, and describes the way its leader Karl Fischer acquired "*charisma*" as leader of the trend for escaping from the "culture of the sofa" to a kind of life "where youth could regain its birthright." In part two he shows how economic insecurity and the craving for the inspiration of a leader through times of crisis and desperation was shrewdly exploited by the Nazis with the bait of opportunities for power and cunning appeals to emotion and fear. Alternating description with personal narratives reconstructed from documents, refugees' reminiscences and other sources he depicts the methods by which Baldur von Shirach forced myriad youth factions into the common mould of the Hitler Youth, though even there non-conformist elements still agitated below the surface.

There will be English readers who will smile at the enormous array of footnotes as the typical machinery of American scholarship but one may well be glad that the author has undertaken the task. "This little book," he reminds us, is informed by "an exploratory purpose, and that only. The eventual structure will be the work of many hands." He stresses that the book was virtually completed before he himself joined the American Office of Strategic Services organization in wartime. It is clear that his experiences with O.S.S. enabled him to confirm the relevance of his assessments to subsequent developments amongst German youth, although he was necessarily precluded from utilizing here information derived from his wartime services.

In chapter eleven, headed "Premonitions", mention is made of student revolts in wartime against the Nazi régime, including the Catholics and even such lawless "dead end kids" elements as the gangs calling themselves the Edelweiss Pirates and similar blood-and-thunder titles. The very names recall Hitler's own admiration for Karl May, German equivalent of Fennimore Cooper, whose tales of redskins and cowboys, he felt, encouraged the cunning and ruthless resource which needed to be encouraged in German youth. Indeed, elsewhere in these pages, the possibility of the Edelweiss later fomenting trouble against constructive German elements under the Allied occupation is also anticipated.

Without dilating upon the private enormities of Nazi leaders the author shows how such reputations of immorality, perversity, etc. or, alternatively, attributions of asceticism, helped to arouse loyalty through self-identification or wishful self-fulfilment amongst different sections of the German population. The sexual aberrations that recur among such youth groups find mention here without overmuch elaboration. And does the author point the way out of such a quagmire?—the reader may inquire.

The author is probably wise to have avoided pronouncing some all-embracing panacea of hope and, at least, he sensibly shuns the formal logic of the schoolroom when investigating such an inchoate subject as German mentality. For instance, he refers to the antipathy for Jews engendered in the German mentality by their association in thought with metropolitan culture and detached internationalism. Logically, it would be

obvious to point out that many German Jews were fanatical patriots for the Fatherland; and as for their being boulevard-minded, "asphalt", in Goebbels' phrase (so true of himself!), I can remember encountering Jews among the wandering students at Freiburg University in 1923, who likewise loathed city sophistication. But one is not dealing with facts but with much more potent myths which sway German mentality and, on closer inspection of anti-Semitism, the mentality of people in other countries as well.

BERNARD CAUSTON.

A SHORT HISTORY OF JAPAN, by A. C. Sadler. *Angus & Robertson.* 21*s.*

THE FUTURE OF JAPAN, by William C. Johnstone. *Oxford University Press.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

These two books give a full survey of what Japan was under her own guidance and what she may be under the Allies'. Japanese history is for the most part very dull. There are no written records earlier than the eighth century A.D. and even after the founding of Nara and Kyoto when, under inspiration from the Augustan age of the Tang dynasty in China, Japan's polity first took a definite shape, it is difficult to see the wood for the jungle of court and daimyo treasons, stratagems and spoils. Intent on facts rather than romance Professor Sadler has rather overloaded his pages with difficult names and petty intrigues which may daunt less erudite readers. This method, however, produces a concise and valuable record of events since the Meiji Restoration, on which Professor Sadler purposely did not enlarge in view of the vast number of available books on this period.

But crime and intrigue apart, Professor Sadler shows two Japanese characteristics which stand out conspicuously.

First is that high culture and love of beauty and order which seem so strangely inconsistent with Japanese cruelty in war. Verse-making was a very early passion of the Japanese; in the arrangement of flowers they are unapproachable; Kyoto is one of the loveliest cities in the world, inhabited by craftsmen in silver, bronze, lacquer and porcelain who have no equal. In the second place, the Japanese have undoubted genius for constitution-building. Prince Shotoku, Nobunaga, Yoritomo, Iyeyasu and Ito were statesmen of the first class; and although Western democracy may frown upon their methods, it could, with advantage, study some clauses in Shotoku's Constitution which with other interesting documents Professor Sadler gives in a series of appendices which should not be missed.

These characteristics are specially worth remembering now that Japan's future lies so largely in the Allies' hands. Writing before the end of the war Mr. Johnstone anticipates with extraordinary insight all that General MacArthur has had to do for the stamping out of militarism. An interesting (though now academic) summing up of the arguments for and against retaining the Emperor comes down rather heavily against Hirohito. Mr. Johnstone may now agree with Admiral Nimitz that "we were lucky to have the Emperor there" to give the command for instant surrender, which happily falsified Mr. Johnstone's anticipations of violent resistance to the Allied occupation. What Mr. Johnstone did not foresee was Russia's entry into the war. The efforts of the Communists to get hold of the enormous trade union movement (intentionally stimulated by General MacArthur in order to develop the democratic spirit) are not a pleasant sign.

Mr. Johnstone shows that in some ways Japan has actually gained by defeat and he thinks that she will develop into a comfortable middle-class State like Sweden, thriving on light industries. Shorn as she is of her empire, without money or materials, the notion that Japan can start again on the rampage within any measurable future is ridiculous. There still appears to many observers

too much demand for prolonged occupation and control. The West has tried many different methods with the Japanese, first cheating them over the gold exchange, then, in turn, coercing, patronizing, and execrating them. Nobody seems to have thought it might pay to treat them as human beings. The rejection of their request for the principle of racial equality to be included in the League of Nations' charter, and the American Immigration Act of 1923 had more to do with the late war than is generally suspected.

O. M. GREEN.

SAINTS AND STRANGERS, by George F. Willison. *William Heinemann.* 15*s.*

The legend of the Pilgrim Fathers dates, apparently, from 1769, in which year members of the Old Colony Club of Plymouth, New England, agreed to celebrate the landing of their forefathers. Their information about these first settlers was then rather vague. Most of what is known about them was contained in a manuscript memoir (which no one consulted), written by Governor Bradford and entitled 'Of Plimouth Plantation'. And hardly had the Pilgrim legend begun to grow than this manuscript disappeared from a private library in Boston. This was during the War of Independence and the darkest American suspicions about Anglican Bishops were amply confirmed when the manuscript eventually turned up at Fulham Palace in 1855. In the absence of this important document legend could grow without hindrance, and grow it did, reaching unexpected heights in the bicentenary of 1820. Even so, the annual celebration might have remained a local affair had not a greengrocer at Rhyl in North Wales used a Boston newspaper to wrap up a customer's purchase. The newspaper contained an account of Forefathers' Day, as observed in 1824, and it was on this slender foundation that the customer, Mrs. Hemans, based her celebrated poem. The word 'Pilgrim' does not seem to have been in general use before about 1850, but the story had before then become an accepted part of American mythology. Inconvenient facts since brought to light have been treated firmly on the declared principle: "We much prefer established error to novel truth."

The painstaking author of *Saints and Strangers* admits at the outset that it is useless to strive against mythology. What every American schoolboy knows must be accepted, for all practical purposes, as fact. But he attempts to set on record, for those who are interested, such additional facts as are capable of proof. His book, although not the first of its kind (as his valuable bibliography shows) is a thorough summary of what has been done. It is well written, well documented and well arranged. If occasionally tedious, it is because the people of whom he writes can fairly be so described. Apart from that inevitable fault, Mr. Willison errs only in occa-

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sional confusion between what is known and what is merely supposed. When, for example, he describes how the *Mayflower's* "anchor went down with a rattle of chains", one is tempted to propose a search for the chains in question —which, if found, Mr. Willison would be certainly entitled to keep. In dealing, however, with events in Holland before the *Mayflower* sailed, and events at Plymouth after she had arrived, the author is on firmer ground and his story merits every respect.

Taking the current legend that a group of Puritans fled from Lincolnshire to Holland and thence, in search of religious liberty and social equality, to New England, Mr. Willison has no difficulty in showing its falsity. They were not, to begin with, Puritans; and any English movement to celebrate the anniversary of their departure would be at least as misconceived as the American fuss about their landing. Of the passengers in the *Mayflower* only three came originally from Scrooby and only forty-one altogether from Leyden. The remainder (sixty-one out of a hundred and two) were not 'Saints' but 'Strangers'—a miscellaneous lot of people sent out—as were the 'Saints' themselves—by a Joint-Stock Company in London. The aim of the Company was a profit, which was never made. The object of the emigrants was to improve their lot, which some succeeded in doing. Freedom for separatist worship had nothing to do with it, for it was a freedom which the 'Saints', when in Holland, already had, and which the 'Strangers', from England, did not want. The *Mayflower*, finally, was supposed to be bound for Virginia and there is a certain mystery about how she came to visit Cape Cod at all.

It is curious that the author, having learnt to disbelieve the nonsense he was taught in school about America, still apparently believes the nonsense he was taught in school about England. In one paragraph the reader is left to suppose that Sir Thomas More died a Protestant Martyr, and in another he is assured that the Elizabethans never swam. But these are trifling flaws in a book about New England and are only quoted as showing that the author, in exposing one myth, is still the victim of another. Taken as a whole, this is an admirable and useful work. The early settlers have long deserved something better than pietistic sentiment, and here at last they have it.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

FOUR STUDIES IN LOYALTY,

by Christopher Sykes. *Collins.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Christopher Sykes has been variously compared to Saki, Sir Max Beerbohm and Harold Nicolson, but a glance at what is common to these three reveals their peculiar virtue as the possession of a quality which does not lend itself to comparison. In this Christopher Sykes resembles them, for he is an original writer of great distinction. But he is not like them, or indeed any other writer.

The four studies are linked to each other in that each is dominated by loyalty to an idea. The first three are of individual characters, while the last describes the French among whom the author was dropped by parachute behind the German lines in 1944. It is designed as a mark of gratitude to depict the single character impelling those among whom he lived, surpassing in strength the "evil mass-character of the Germans."

The first and perhaps the best is of the author's great uncle and namesake, whose niche in life was that of boon companion to Edward VII when Prince of Wales: in loyalty to this snobbish rôle the Christopher Sykes of that era gave up everything after a life of degradation, which never lost its fidelity to the path chosen; "As your Royal Highness pleases" was his invariable reply, even when soda-water was being pumped over his head. The memory of the friendship between the Prince and this

sweet-tempered man of fashion would be fittingly preserved after his death by a clock over the stables! It is a brilliant sketch but hardly less so is the second in the book, that of Bahram Kirmani, a Persian rogue, linked chronologically with the first portrait by "their having shared the same world of pomp and pleasure for a brief space." The idea to which this fantastic adventurer in his turn was loyal was that he was a scholar of Balliol, an Oxford man: it was quite false, but the accounts he was able to give of Oxford and fashionable England in his alleged day are completely convincing.

Loyalty is perhaps a strange word to apply to the ideas which enriched the lives of these two curious figures, but in Bahram's case loyalty to his early ideals of Oxford kept him from assisting the Germans during the war. A Balliol man would not do such a thing. "I well remember George Curzon saying to me . . ." was one of Bahram's openings.

The third portrait is of Robert Byron, but it is more ambitious than the others and does not altogether fit into the same setting. For it is more than a portrait in being an attempt to rescue the name of a beloved friend from oblivion.

There are some writers the lucidity of whose expression in their choice of words and arrangement of sentences makes it a delight to read whatever they write, whatever it is about. Christopher Sykes may be unhesitatingly classed among them (Bertrand Russell and Lord Moran in *The Anatomy of Courage* are examples), but the trouble about them is that the style is so felicitous that the reader is carried on, even against his will, often in danger of being quite uncritical of the matter expressed. There is just a suspicion that this is what happens to the reader in this third portrait—so much longer than the others—an inescapable feeling that less might have been said with more effect. It is a small complaint to make against such a fascinating book.

J. F. Burnet.

THE CULT OF POWER, by Rex Warner. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

The true allegorical writers of the past such as Bunyan, Dostoievsky or Franz Kafka, were all prophets of literature who depended for their enduring inspiration on a deep moral concern for man and the mystery of his earthly predicament. Mr. Rex Warner is an accredited member of this company of myth-makers; he fits precisely into this tradition where life is illuminated by symbol and suggestion, as readers of *The Professor, The Aerodrome,* and *Why Was I Killed?* will know.

Though the eight essays in this book cover a wide choice of subjects from the opening essay on "The Cult of Power" and that "On Reading Dickens", to the longer "Dostoievsky and the Collapse of Liberalism", unity is not sacrificed to variety, for the novelist-poet, writing

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in a more personal medium, is pursuing the same task of elucidation and explanation. Literature, as Mr. Warner defines it, "is always, in one way or other, an affirmation of the future or the past against the present; it dies stone-dead if, from servility or stupidity, it begins to glorify the existing state of affairs as though they were changeless and immortal." So, in his desire to arrive at truth Mr. Warner turns to the past for enlightenment, to Dickens the apostle of humanity and the social critic; to Dostoievsky who saw so clearly into the dark future. Also he comments on the necessity of studying the classics in order to avoid falling into the error of creating a superstition out of the growing respect for science. Man himself is what matters; and the writer, if he would serve in the restoration of human faith and self-respect, must know something of what has been and scan the future in eager anticipation of the new pattern.

In regard to the basic question of spiritual and cultural change, this artist's own development is of particular interest. For him the greatest problem of our time is the reconciliation of the scientific revolutionary spirit with those other human aspirations which find their normal expression in religion, art and morality. Mr. Warner started out as an enthusiastic Marxist accepting art as a form of propaganda. Gradually, however, his views were modified; he did not feel drawn to outward forms but to those persanal convictions that seemed to beat in harmony with the pulse of the time.

Still sympathetic to the Marxist conception of history, Rex Warner still believes also in propaganda for revolution; but it is a revolution of ideas, a personal responsibility in which the citizen must evolve for himself new standards and create his own sense of unity in an age bereft of both.

More than any other English writer this one has succeeded in establishing imaginative contact with those forces that shape mankind for a new era of co-operation. His view is a long-term one and not necessarily optimistic; but beyond the revolt of individual against neighbour and community, of nations against the international society, he sees not only an ethic of world-brotherhood but a state of society wherein men work for this ultimate ideal. With the fervour of a moralist and the restraint of an artist, Rex Warner labours to point out that in man is the riddle of the universe to be discovered.

E. W. MARTIN.

LONDON IS INVINCIBLE, by Dorothy Hood. *Hutchinson.* 21*s.*

Few if any of the twenty-odd thousand books written about London contain so much information, historical and anecdotal, as does this book.

The author was reared in the secure and leisured Victorian age but it is not only the past with which she is concerned. She writes of London to-day still bearing the scars of the German air onslaught.

Her readers are invited to a personally conducted tour from Chelsea in the south-west to Aldgate in the east and from Paddington in the north-west to the Thames and the Palace of Westminster. This breathless pilgrimage goes from street to street and her rich store of memories and researches illumines both the ugly ruins and surviving buildings with historical or legendary interest.

Miss Hood is a buoyant personality not at all depressed by the present destruction, for she recounts with relish the previous fires and plagues which have afflicted the city. From the pages of Pepys and Stow she shows the effects of such happenings on the minds of contemporary Londoners and their efforts to overcome such disasters. Because the present generation had only contempt for Hitler and his works she is convinced that London will again emerge triumphant. For in that contempt she sees once more the true strain of the Londoner revealed—a people proud of its city and heritage.

The value of the book is considerably enhanced by the inclusion of thirty-four excellent reproductions of early prints of London. Two slips are noted: it is I think fairly well established that the site of the old St. Stephen's Chapel is now occupied not by the Houses of Parliament but by a connecting lobby, and it is many years since the Continental trains started from Charing Cross Station, Victoria (and, rarely, Cannon Street) having supplanted it for that purpose.

Quite apart from its readability this book will be treasured to-day by all lovers of London and by succeeding generations as a valuable reference and guide.

HERBERT T. BANYARD.

MEMOIRS OF AN AMATEUR MUSICIAN, by Edmund H. Fellowes, C.H. *Methuen.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

The name of Canon Fellowes is so well known among musicians for the pioneer work he has done in the revival of English music of the Tudor period that one is apt to forget that he is an amateur musician. While a fellow cleric and another amateur musician, the late Canon Galpin, was pursuing his researches into old English musical instruments, Canon Fellowes gave us first his monumental edition of the English Madrigal School and books on English Madrigal Verse, followed closely by the works of the Lutenist Song Writers. These editions are not mere antiquarian transcriptions of the old part books, but are coloured by a lively appreciation of the needs of present-day singers.

The man who was to accomplish these great tasks began his musical life as a violinist. Among his earliest experiences were regular visits to the orchestral concerts at the Crystal Palace under August Manns, and to the "popular" chamber concerts at St. James's Hall with the Joachim Quartet. It was Joachim himself who encouraged Fellowes's early efforts and advised a professional training and career.

Although this course was not followed, Fellowes entered fully into the musical life of Oxford and gives an interesting account of the Oxford Musical Club and the Musical Union during his residence. After clerical appointments as a curate at Wandsworth and as Precentor at Bristol, Dr. Fellowes began in 1900 his long association with St. George's Chapel, Windsor. A chapter is devoted to the many State ceremonies in which he has taken part.

In 1927 Dr. Fellowes toured Canada with a choir formed of the Gentlemen of St. George's Chapel and the Choristers of Westminster Abbey, and this was followed by a number of lecture tours of Canada and the U.S.A., which brought many interesting experiences.

These memoirs reveal the author as a man of wide interests. Almost as much space is devoted to the world of sport—rowing and tennis—as that of music; and in the field of research, the study of heraldry and genealogy goes hand in hand with musicology.

This book will be read with interest by those who remain of Canon Fellowes's contemporaries, and the earlier pages present a good picture of some aspects of English life towards the end of the nineteenth century. But one cannot help feeling that the book has suffered a little through haste in its preparation, some pages reading like a series of diary notes rather than a continuous narrative. One hesitates to criticize an author of Canon Fellowes's seventy-six years, and wishes that the publisher's reader had been more helpful.

EDGAR HUNT.

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

THE NEW YEAR begins most enjoyably for this section of THE FORTNIGHTLY, for every one of the books now on the table deserves more than its mathematical allocation of space—a seventeenth part of three pages—already reduced, alas, by this felicitation. In WAR OR PEACE ? (*Oxford University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*) Lionel Curtis refrains from a wholly pessimistic answer. After reviewing past mistakes he reaches his ideal of an international union which would in time become a world commonwealth of democracies. An impressive warning is contained in his explanation of the current fatalism. Everyone

> has been so concerned with efforts to settle the treaties of peace that no further step has been taken to deal with what all thoughtful men agree is the fundamental cause of war.

——But machinery for peace-making there must be, and Louis Dolivet in THE UNITED NATIONS (*Phoenix.* 6*s.*) supplies as Trygve Lie says in the preface, " a highly interesting and understanding view " of UNO. The book defines for the layman the functions, powers and aims of " civilization's last chance " and its appendices alone should make it a standard work of reference.

Orange, crescent and star

How one democracy has set about its post-war recovery is told in ORANGE ON TOP by A. Royalton-Kisch (*A. W. Sijthoff's Publishing Co., Leyden. Dutch fl.* 3.50). The chapters are in the form of letters to specialists in various spheres in Great Britain, for examples, to a town planner, a Member of Parliament, an artist, an industrialist, describing the appropriate conditions in Holland. This absorbing story of the Dutch people and their tenacity of purpose should be more readily accessible to readers in this country. The numerous photographs are particularly fine ; in fact, when the dust jacket is removed, the complete recuperation of Holland's printing trade is here proclaimed.——If only affairs in Palestine were as uncomplicated ; M. F. Abcarius gives the Arab point of view in PALESTINE (*Hutchinson.* 12*s.* 6*d.*) but fails to convince, in spite of a readable and documented account, that his case is as fool-proof as he believes. Mr. Bevin's plight as the inheritor of this problem demands the sympathy and forbearance of both sides. The mandate is a heavy burden; surely it is time that a sovereign Power be found to place the conflict of Jew and Arab before the United Nations.

Personal approaches

" Having wandered through the length and breadth of Palestine," as Doughty wrote in *Arabia Deserta,* his preface to the second edition of this masterpiece may now be read in THE PERSONAL NOTE, an anthology of first and last words from Chaucer to Keats compiled by H. J. C. Grierson and Sandys Wason (*Chatto & Windus.* 7*s.* 6*d.*). Sir Herbert Grierson hints of the pleasure the making of this book gave to him and his partner, a pleasure that is passed on in full to the reader. All these pieces, mostly the preludes to well-known works with a few epilogues too, are able to stand alone in merit (the preface is of course the author's *last* thoughts) and Coventry Patmore's, for instance, should be framed and placed on the desk of every poet now writing. ——Probably the late John Laird derived a more sober pleasure from his PHILOSOPHICAL INCURSIONS INTO ENGLISH LITERATURE (*Cambridge University Press.* 12*s.* 6*d.*). Though not easy to read, the book should be within reach of all students of such diverse characters as Shakespeare, Defoe, Pope, Isaac Watts, Sterne, Wordsworth, Shelley, Dickens, Browning, Hardy and Bridges, for the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen brought to light here many more facets of their work than the ordinary lover of literature could find for himself.

Britain's "pictorial genius"

Michael Ayrton, too, brings his trained eyes and mind to the subject of

BRITISH DRAWINGS. Perhaps a little on the defensive about nationalism in art, he but shows a proper aversion to using a bad word. While tracing the history of British drawing from the tenth century he displays erudition with charm. From what he calls " the desert " after the dissolution of the monasteries, through " the resurrection " in Hogarth, he brings his willing reader to " the ascendancy " of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, only to plunge into " the decline " of the Victorian era where he finds the torch kept alight, on the whole, only by the social commentators. Happily, he sees a " second resurrection " shaping from the 'nineties. Messrs. Collins, who always match the quality of text and illustrations in their " Britain in Pictures " series t4*s.* 6*d.*) have now more than maintained (heir standard in both media.

Fun at school

And now two books which have grown from more orthodox scholarship. MOONLIGHT AT THE GLOBE (*Michael Joseph.* 9*s.* 6*d.*) is an essay in Shakespeare production, based on a performance of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* at Harrow School, by Ronald Watkins, with detailed drawings by Maurice Percival, and introduced by the headmaster. The stage was arranged in the Speech Room to resemble the Globe Playhouse. Shakespeare at Harrow must at least be as exciting as he is at the Old Vic.—— WHEN WE'RE AT SCHOOL (*Witherby.* 8*s.* 6*d.*) was " written by over thirty of us : ages 10 to 13½. Illustrated by three of us : ages 13½ to 15." The new boy says : " Altogether I found out that it was not so bad to be in a boarding school" and, what with art and science societies, parliament, puppet shows, newspaper, printing press and this book, we can see what he means.

Father to the man

An unhappy little boy is the subject of Wallace Fowlie's RIMBAUD (*Dobson.* 8*s.* 6*d.*). As his first verses " are his last and the only ones he wrote " the author seeks to find the psychological link between childhood and the great poetry he produced. He wrote nothing after the age of twenty and this " myth of childhood " is painstakingly pursued back through the expression of the art which Mr. Fowlie truly says " remains a supreme example if quest and flight, of blasphemy and prayer, of innocency and hell." Unfairly, as so often happens to the man whose childhood was marred, it is hard to like Rimbaud himself.

Birds and flowers

The innocency of FLOWERS OF MARSH AND STREAM (*King Penguin.* 2*s.* 6*d.*) by Iolo Williams with drawings by Noel Rooke, is undefiled. Water colour or ink, the illustrations have all a delicacy which combines with a text adorned by judicious quotation to make what may be called, with no denigration, a tender book. Garden lovers will be astonished, perhaps pained, to see how similar are the aristocrats of border and rockery to these shaggier ancestors.——A NATURALIST ON LINDISFARNE by Richard Perry (*Lindsay Drummond.* 15*s.*) takes us to the vast and varied bird population of Holy Island ; as FORTNIGHTLY readers know, Mr. Perry is at home with sea birds. He devotes the first part of this book to a history of Lindisfarne, which provides an admirable background for his 256 species (listed with notes at the end) and introduces the general reader gradually to the intensities of bird watching that follow ; the many photographs enhance the book's attractiveness.

Country peace

THE WEB OF THE YEAR by C. M. Mason (*Hutchinson.* 9*s.*) goes back to nature in all its phases. The announcement that this is a " £10,000 United Nations Literary Competition Selection " should not be allowed to daunt the reader, who will find a collection of essays divided under the headings of the four seasons, all pervaded with a keen love for the countryside, for quietness, for beauty. The author communicates his happy spirit throughout, even when he is defending the vegetable garden against " flower snobbishness," the

drabness of winter (to a Londoner !) and the " unruly English climate " (ditto ! !). His chapter headings are so enticing that they should not be kept exclusively for the index and the beginning of each essay. Like Lamb, this should become a much-thumbed book but, unlike Lamb, you cannot flick over its leaves and be caught up by the line at the top of every page.

Flouting fashion

The note at the beginning of WRITERS OF TODAY (*Sidgwick & Jackson.* 8*s.* 6*d.*), edited by Denys Val Baker, says : " it has become a literary fashion to classify writing and writers into various schools or movements." Yes indeed, and too much pushing of their subject into a fixed mould by those critics who have hastened to be in the fashion has stultified their work and naturally wearied those who seek guidance. It is refreshing therefore to come upon this volume which binds its twelve writers into no coterie and whose guardians are united only by a personal interest in their subjects, who are thus assessed as individuals. From the general impressions left from reading the book two immediate ones arise : Aldous Huxley's decline as a novelist and the growth of Edith Sitwell as a poet.

As in a glass

The verse in POEMS FROM NEW WRITING selected by John Lehmann (*Lehmann.* 8*s.* 6*d.*) reassuringly makes good his claim in the foreword that " this anthology may turn out to be a peculiarly interesting poetic mirror of our time." The dates are pregnant with happenings of course—1936-1946 : Spanish war to world war—and should have left writers with little enough space to see their own reflections. Of the poems which come near to verse journalism A. S. J. Tessimond's " England," W. H. Auden's " Refugee Blues," Walter Allen's " Colliery Country " and Stephen Spender's " In Memoriam " seem to be first-rate examples. Donald Bain states the case for the modern war poet in eight terse lines, and C. Day Lewis writes :

> Death's cordon narrows : but vainly
> If I've slipped the carrier word

and states the case for all poets. Omissions, of course, there are (John Heath-Stubb's has a sad poem in memory of his friend, Sidney Keyes) but the translations from European poets in various countries are especially welcome. Enough is here to be able to say of most of the writers, as John Lehmann in " The Sphere of Glass " puts it,

> . . . they were poets, and content
> Sharing the one deep-vistaed way.

Family affairs

Two novels, which start off very agreeably as uncontroversial stories of the kind which used to be called " light," both develop into histories of some social significance without losing their bloom. Published by *Hutchinson* they are ENGLISH MAIDEN by Frank Swinnerton (10*s.* 6*d.*) and WESTOVER by Richmal Crompton (9*s.* 6*d.*) The first is concerned with Sally as girl, wife and mother and the vicissitudes which come to her through marrying " the son of the house." The simple village child learns in her late 'twenties to control and make prosperous a great publishing house and Mr. Swinnerton's skill is able to persuade that this is credible.

The scene of *Westover* is a country house which has been " converted " into flats and the situations grow around the interlocking lives of the occupants. Both books should give unalloyed pleasure to that very large number of people who still hanker for " family " tales and even yet feel that unselfishness is worth reading about.

GRACE BANYARD.

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